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In recent years, composition classes in universities across the country have
focused more and more on social and political issues like race, class, and gender. At its
base, this dissertation argues that prophetic religious belief should receive such a focus as
well. This project also attempts to recognize the difficulties that might arise when
addressing religion in the writing class and subsequently draws upon the thinking of the
American Pragmatists to meet those difficulties. From this Pragmatic foundation, I
explore notions of mediation, experience, habit, and certainty in the hopes of providing
some orientation to a topic that is as important to our students as any other we ask them
to consider.
My theoretical grounding is set out with an eye towards practical application in
the classroom (as theory is little without practice, and practice little without theory). I
address possible writing assignments, particular texts, and the use of current events in
relation to the Pragmatic approach I describe. In sum, this dissertation is an attempt to
help all of us—atheists and theists, students and teachers—broach the topic of religion in
the composition class.
FAITH IN THE COMPOSIITION CLASS: A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH TO COMMON GROUND
by
Joseph B. Wagner
A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of The Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Greensboro
2007
Approved by
_______________________
Committee Chair
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This Dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of
The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
Committee Chair___________________________
Committee Members________________________
________________________
____________________________
Date of Acceptance by Committee
____________________________
Date of Final Oral Examination
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER
I. RELIGIOUS BELIEF: THAT OTHER SOCIAL ISSUE....……………......1
II. GOD IN THE COMP CLASS…………………………………………….10
The Purpose of the First-Year Writing Class………………….....11
Religious Belief as a Social and Political Issue
in the United States Today……………………………………...22
The Fear of God………………………………………………….40
III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF……………….45
A Popular Misconception of Pragmatism………………………..47
The Pragmatists on Religion……………………………………..50
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS IN THE CLASSROOM……………...105
Framing the Issue…………………………………………….....106
Questioning Authority……………………………………….....109
Activities and Texts…………………………………………….115
V. BELIEF AND DISBELIEF: PRAGMATIC PARTNERS IN
THE WRITING CLASS……………………………………………….138
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………149
1
CHAPTER I
RELIGIOUS BELIEF: THAT OTHER SOCIAL ISSUE
For anyone who has paid the least bit of attention to the political scene or to
current events in this country over the last several years, religious belief would appear to
be anything but on the periphery. We seem to have reached another high-water mark in
our country’s ongoing and turbulent debate over the place of religion in the public sphere,
and it doesn’t seem likely that this topic will slip from the headlines any time soon. As a
social or political issue in this country religion has, over the last decade or so, arguably
captured more national media attention than race, class, or gender (with, of course, a few
major exceptions, like Katrina’s visit to the Gulf Coast which momentarily fixed our eye
on race and class). This attention, however, has not by any means translated into the first-
year composition class, a class where social and political issues now often provide the
impetus for writing instruction. For the last twenty years or so, discussions of race,
gender, class, and sexual identity have been residing more and more at the heart of most
composition texts and composition classrooms. In 1996 Keith Gilyard, drawing in part on
the work of John Dewey and others, captured the dominate inclination towards this
course in the following: “Writing is not an activity that features social responsibility as an
option. Writing is social responsibility. When you write, you are being responsible to
some social entity even if that entity is yourself. You can be irresponsible as a writer, but
you cannot be non-responsible” (21). He concludes by stating, “Writing and writing
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instruction are socially, not naturally, occurring phenomena. They are never heading
nowhere” (27). Also from the 90s, James Laditka writes, “All teaching supposes
ideology; there simply is no value free pedagogy. For these reasons my paradigm of
composition is changing to one of critical literacy, a literacy of political consciousness
and social action” (361). Our approach to teaching composition has continued to head in
this direction, promoting a sense of civic engagement and critical literacy, a literacy that
emphasizes cultural and communal dimensions of understanding and interpretation
throughout the reading and writing process.
When I entered this field six years ago I was asked to teach from Carter and
Gradin’s Writing as Reflective Action. I have vivid memories of teaching from this text
essays like bell hooks’ “Killing Rage,” Robert Coles’ “Entitlement,” and Paula Rust’s
“Sexual Identity and Bisexual Identities: The Struggle for Self-Description in a Changing
Sexual Landscape” (essays I continue to teach when I can). I have since taught many
other texts, like Bizzell and Herzberg’s Negotiating Difference: Cultural Case Studies for
Composition, that have dealt in similar ways with such issues. This particular book is
broken up into six sections, all of them cultural conflicts from America’s short history: 1)
First Contacts Between Puritans and Native Americans; 2) The Debate Over Slavery and
the Declaration of Independence; 3) Defining ‘Woman’s Sphere’ in Nineteenth Century
American Society; 4) Wealth, Work, and Class Conflict in the Industrial Age; 5)
Japanese American Internment and the Problem of Cultural Identity; 6) Policy and
Protest Over the Vietnam War. Each section provides representative voices on its
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respective cultural issue, together with related writing prompts and further reading lists
for students to consider.
Textbooks such as these dominate the market, and they exemplify the social
responsibility to which Keith Gilyard refers as well as the prominent critical literacy
approach to writing instruction—they press us to be socially responsible by requiring us
to analyze and write about cultural concerns like race relations, same-sex marriage, and
gender roles. As a community, these concerns are important and deemed worthy of our
attention. Religious belief is also, of course, a social and political issue—deeply
connected to the other cultural issues we already address in the composition course—and
just as important to us and worthy of our attention in that it so often drives who we are
and what we do in the U. S. (whether we are among the believers or not). But while the
topic of religion often avails itself in our class discussions and chosen textbooks, it
nonetheless has managed to remain on the periphery of most writing texts and
composition classes (with respect to my above examples, I remember avoiding John
Updike’s essay “On Being a Self Forever” in Carter and Gradin’s book because of its
focus on religion and glossing quickly over the religious themes that were overtly
apparent in Negotiating Difference). Amy Goodburn notes, for instance, that “given the
important role that religion plays within U.S. culture (with the majority of U.S. citizens
describing themselves as religious in some way), it’s surprising that so few critical
educators have dealt with the implications for how students’ religious identities often
conflict with the assumptions upon which critical pedagogy is premised” (333). Avoiding
religion in the writing classroom is easy to do, though; we fear proselytizing, we don’t
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want to offend, pry, impose, or alienate. Most writing teachers simply aren’t comfortable
with this subject. One reason is that unlike other issues we have recently become more
comfortable with, religious belief is not something we’re aiming to eradicate like racism
or homophobia. In short, while the call to address religious belief in the composition class
has gotten a little louder in recent years, we still don’t quite know what to do with it; we
have yet to develop and articulate a theoretical method from which to proceed. Doing so
is the primary purpose of this dissertation.
Before outlining the pragmatic method that I propose, however, I want to make a
few initial comments here about my use of the term religious belief. It goes without
saying that this term is slippery and difficult, if not impossible, to define. As William
James says of religion, the fact that there are so many different precise definitions for the
term proves that it “cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a
collective name” (Varieties 35). For the purposes of my argument, I am referring to
organized, prophetic religious belief that holds at its core the infallibility of the prophet
and the inerrancy of the sacred text. Clearly, such a definition includes Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, among others, and the following discussion is equally applicable
to all of them. I choose for this project, however, to focus on Christianity as my example,
and I do so for two principal reasons. First, of the prophecy religions, Christianity has
overwhelmingly dominated public policy-making in the United States as well as our
discussions concerning the relationship between church and state. Second, in my own
experiences in the classroom, when students have made references to religious belief,
they have almost always been to Christianity. Indeed, my interest in this project was born
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from the pedagogical question, “how should I respond when my students bring up Jesus
and the Bible?”
Not all of us in this profession, of course, believe that we should even be
entertaining such a question in the writing class. For instance, in her 1992 article
“Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing,” Maxine Hairston argues that it’s
irresponsible for us to focus on social and political subjects like race, class, and gender in
the composition course. She strenuously posits that we must avoid politicizing the
composition class, refrain from forcing our political positions on our students, and strive
to provide a low-risk environment in which they can improve their writing (669, 670). 
She specifically cautions us against delving into topics that we are not particularly trained
for: “We have no business getting into areas where we may have passion and conviction
but no scholarly base from which to operate,” she argues. “When classes focus on
complex issues such as racial discrimination, economic injustices, and inequities of class
and gender, they should be taught by qualified faculty who have the depth of information
and historical competence that such critical social issues warrant” (667).
But over the last fifteen years or so, Hairston’s misgivings have been soundly
answered, as the current market for composition textbooks attests. Varieties of Gilyard’s
contention that “writing is social responsibility” have been appearing with more
frequency since John Dewey so thoroughly articulated his position that “education is
necessarily a social institution” and “an extension of social life.” Patricia Bizzell, for
instance, tells us that we must value the “non-academic cultural literacies” that all of our
students bring to the writing class (662). And in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, James
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Berlin asserts that in “teaching people to write and read, we are thus teaching them a way
of experiencing the world. This realization requires that the writing classroom be
dialogic. Only through articulating the disparate positions held by members of the class
can different ways of understanding the world and acting in it be discovered” (102).
More specifically, he notes that “differences among students organize themselves around
class, race, gender, age, and other divisions, and it is the responsibility of the teacher to
make certain that these differences are enunciated and examined” (102). I imagine Berlin
would acknowledge that religion makes up one of those “other divisions” to which he
refers—it’s telling, in fact, that it does not specifically appear in his list. Its absence may
be indicative of our general feeling about enunciating or examining religion in the
classroom—the feeling that it’s simply off limits. But if we embrace Berlin’s definition
(or one like it) of what it means to teach people to read and write, this feeling must
change.
The composition community overwhelmingly decided to “forge ahead” in spite of
Hairston’s objections, and by most accounts, it appears to have been more than worth it.
Our current queasiness about religious belief, however, mirrors almost exactly those
concerns that Hairston voiced a decade and a half ago about race, class, and gender. As
such, we have already established our basic response from pedagogical philosophers like
Dewey, Bizzell, Berlin, and Gilyard. What we don’t have is a method to deal with the
way in which religious belief is peculiar—for instance, as I mentioned before, it’s not
something we’re aiming to eradicate like racism or misogyny, and thus we feel stymied
from the outset. The pragmatic approach I propose can guide us in that its philosophy is
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based not on any ultimate outcomes, but on constantly reexamining the consequences of
our beliefs; i.e., it is dependant on experience rather than on a priori judgments, on
mediation rather than on opposition. We thus avoid entering into a debate about whether
or not God exists; i.e., whether or not theists or atheists are “right.” Rather, we focus on
examining the consequences—to ourselves and to our neighbors, here and now—of our
belief (or disbelief) in Him.
At the base of this dissertation is the notion that we need from the outset to let our
students know that they don’t have to check their faith at the door—that it’s welcome and
it’s valuable, but that like anything else they may think or write about in this course, it
doesn’t simply get a free pass. The pragmatists lead us in this direction, for as James
defines it, pragmatism should be “a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking with
the more religious demands of human beings” (Pragmatism 33), and he notes that “the
truth of ‘God’ has to run the gauntlet of all our other truths. It is on trial by them, and
they on trial by it. Our final opinion about God can be settled only after all the truths have
straightened themselves out together. Let us hope that they shall find a modus vivendi!”
(50). Again, as a method, pragmatism depends on constantly questioning and examining
the consequences of our beliefs—all of our beliefs. As C. S. Peirce notes, we must “be at
all times ready to dump [our] whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against
them” (“Ideas,” 294). Such a premise, of course, is a hallmark of critical literacy.
By giving us a “way in” to religious belief, the pragmatic method not only helps
us meet our social responsibility and critical literacy goals in the composition class, it
also enables us to bridge an ever-widening gap between our theistic students and the
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secular academic setting. Joseph Harris, for example, asks, “how does a devout
Christian…find a place to speak within an aggressively skeptical and secular discourse?”
(17). Likewise, Stephen Carter observes in The Culture of Disbelief that the academic
setting often encourages an environment that treats religion as “an unimportant facet of
human personality, one easily discarded, and one with which public-spirited citizens
would not bother” (xv). In a similar vein, John Groppe suggests that “the academic
setting for many students is frightening, but it is especially so for students of a strong
religious background” (Abstract). Groppe goes on to quote Robert Sollod, who calls “the
current curriculum of American colleges and universities ‘the hollow curriculum’ as
‘American Universities now largely ignore religion and spirituality’” (Abstract). Groppe
adds that what Sollod suggests “may be the best situation many students encounter. More
often what they encounter is an environment hostile to religion” (Abstract). With its focus
on inclusion and mediation, the pragmatic method works to diffuse such initial feelings of
hostility and provides opportunities for productive discussions about religious belief.
In Chapter One, “God in the Comp Class,” I take up the purpose of the required
first-year writing course and support the contention that we would be doing a great
disservice to our students and to ourselves if we continue to ignore religion. We need to
talk about it for many reasons, not the least of which are that it makes up a large part of
most of our students’ lives and that attempting to understand it has become more and
more crucial to engaging in civic life. I also address in this chapter the fears that both
students and teachers may have in approaching the subject of religion—these fears are
real and substantial, but by no means insurmountable. Chapter Two, “A Pragmatic
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Approach to Faith,” presents the approach that I believe can help us tremendously as we
begin to broach this topic in the writing class. I set out some of the more general tenets of
Pragmatism as offered by James, Pierce, and Dewey (and by other pragmatists like
Richard Rorty and Cornel West), but I focus primarily on what these three writers have to
say about religion and God.
Chapter Three, entitled “Practical Applications,” articulates some tangible ways
in which teachers might begin to take the previous theoretical discussion and actually
apply it in the writing class. I begin by reiterating the notion that our first task should be
to let students know that it’s appropriate to talk about or write about their religious belief,
but that rules of argument and critical thinking still apply. I suggest a number of ways in
which teachers might first broach this topic and then continue to work with it—including
freewriting tasks, journal prompts, literary analyses, rhetorical analyses, sample
questionnaires, and current event assignments—all of which are rooted in the pragmatic
method. My Conclusion, “Pragmatism and Belief in Disbelief,” extends my argument to
the farthest reaches of religious belief: atheism. As religious belief and disbelief are
intimately bound up together—Gianni Vattimo, for example, defines secularism and
atheism as by-products of theism—I explore the way in which this minority but vital
perspective is often understood and how it might operate within our pragmatic discussion
of religious belief in the composition class.
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CHAPTER II
GOD IN THE COMP CLASS
Rhetoric, I shall urge, should be
a study of misunderstanding and
its remedies
I. A. Richards
In 2005, writing for the Chronicle of Higher Education, Stanley Fish recounted
that “when Jacques Derrida died I was called by a reporter who wanted to know what
would succeed high theory and the triumvirate of race, gender, and class as the center of
intellectual energy in the academy. I answered like a shot: religion” (11). Fish, of course,
was referring primarily to the world of literary theory, but his words ring true in many
ways for the freshman composition class in particular and the field of Composition and
Rhetoric in general. In lots of ways religion has been bubbling under the surface now for
years, but as I mentioned in my Introduction, many of us are not comfortable with
religion in the classroom and not convinced (maybe not convinced because we’re not
comfortable) that it is a suitable topic for this arena. By briefly reviewing the purpose of
the first-year writing class and by connecting that purpose to the impact religion has had
on our public policy in recent years, this chapter works initially to support my claim that
we must begin examining the consequences of religious belief in the writing class. At the
heart of this discussion lies the public/private controversy regarding the role of religion,
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or, put another way, the Jeffersonian compromise which more or less relegated religion to
the private sphere in exchange for religious freedom. The chapter concludes with the
argument that by first acknowledging the benefits of possible chaos while at the same
time articulating clear and certain guidelines for broaching this subject in the writing
class, we need not fear talking about religion in the classroom.
The Purpose of the First-Year Writing Class
The purpose of the first-year composition class has been the subject of debate for
some time now, and that debate has taken a number of twists and turns over the last three
hundred years or so. It’s safe to say, though, that a fundamental goal of this course is to
help students become better writers. I’m stating the obvious, perhaps, but it’s an obvious
statement that often gets lost or forgotten. I remember when I first began to teach this
class in 2000 at Ohio University; despite extraordinary instruction and support from those
running the writing program, and despite a clear and defined university “Outcome
Statement” for this particular class, I recall wondering in that first year (and, to be honest,
since then) what it was precisely I was supposed to be doing in the freshman English
class I was teaching. I knew my syllabus said, “English 151 Composition and Rhetoric
focuses on writing, reading, and thinking processes. Students engage in informal writing,
formal writing, peer critiques, revision, active reading, and group work as a means to
becoming successful writers and thinkers, both within and outside the university.” So
there was an emphasis on the social process of writing and a focus on certain activities to
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produce “successful” writers and thinkers. But what did that mean, exactly, and how were
we supposed to go about doing it?
One way, of course, was through the book we were asked to use, Writing As
Reflective Action, which aggressively addresses such controversial issues as race,
misogyny, and homophobia. The essays in this book are, for the most part, intended to
address and raise a student’s social consciousness of marginalized perspectives. I
couldn’t have been happier with this agenda and this book, but a particular session of our
teacher-training course serves as an example of the way in which the purpose of this first-
year writing class tends to get clouded. It may have been around the sixth or seventh
week of the quarter (for most of us, our first quarter of teaching) and one of my fellow
new TAs was suggesting that she didn’t feel competent to teach some of the essays from
our textbook because she didn’t know enough about the history or background of many
of the issues these essays were addressing (one of the points that Maxine Hairston makes
in arguing that such issues should not be the subject of a writing class). It turned out that
in spite of the Outcome Goals and the syllabus and all the other information we had been
given, many in the room were still unsure of what it was they were teaching in freshman
English. I remember very clearly what our professor said at this point: “I was operating
under the assumption that you were teaching writing. If that’s not what you’ve been
doing, then that’s my fault.” But there was no failure on her part that I could see. She did
a great job in this training course (she was, in fact, one of the reasons I entered the field
of Composition and Rhetoric). It’s simply the nature of the beast—what seems to be a
relatively straight-forward task is anything but. We’re here to teach writing. But often as
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we go about this job it’s easy to lose sight of that original goal when the course revolves
around sensitive issues that are relevant to the real world and to the real lives of the
people in the room. Opening the door to religion might appear to muddy the waters even
more. But we have not for some time now been in the habit of ignoring such difficult
issues for a simple and formulaic approach to better writing that we know usually
doesn’t, in fact, lead to better writing. As teachers we must constantly remind ourselves
that in this class the aim is to teach writing and to do the hard work of embracing the
often slippery, scary, and chaotic means that we think most effectively lead to that goal.
One of those means for teaching better writing has been to focus on social and
political issues, issues we hope are somewhat meaningful to our students and thus prompt
them to become more engaged thinkers and writers. This focus is by no means a recent
phenomenon. Social consciousness has had a long-standing relationship with the
introductory composition class in the United States. The early version of this class was
being taught for years before the Revolutionary War at places like Harvard, Yale, and
William and Mary where rhetoricians were primarily responsible for teaching it (but
improving students’ writing was viewed as the responsibility of all faculty, a notion we
continue to struggle with today). The class was required of all students, much as it is
now, and, also like today, the content of the course focused a great deal on the students’
morality, or their social consciousness. Sharon Crowley writes that the contemporary
first-year writing course
retains more than its institutional position: it still performs the sort of
moral surveillance on students that [James Morgan] Hart claims was the
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task of the entire traditional college curriculum. Introductory composition
is the only required course in which students are still asked, repeatedly, to
express their opinions on a variety of topics not generated by their study of
a field or subject matter. Rhetoric teachers in classical colleges felt no
compunction about evaluating the quality of the moral or civic sentiments
expressed by their students; indeed, they felt that doing so was their duty.
(Composition 57)
Teaching writing has long been associated by many with teaching morality, or
character—an association that still exists today and one that makes sense in that
rhetoricians have usually taught this class, and one of the most influential rhetorical
educators, Quintilian, argued for the “good man speaking well” and felt that an effective
education should include all aspects of the student’s life, “for there is nothing which may
not crop up in a cause, or appear as a question for discussion”(II.21.22).
What we know today as the required freshman English class may be said to have
most directly sprung from the work of Harvard’s A.S. Hill in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. In the mid-1880s Hill, a Boylston Professor of Rhetoric at Harvard,
bemoaned what he saw as woefully inadequate writing from his freshman students. In
response, Hill established an entrance examination and proposed an “English A” writing
course that would later be adopted by other colleges and universities as the required
freshman English class. Hill felt this course should emphasize correctness before all else.
Indeed, in his 1892 textbook Foundations of Rhetoric, the first words of his Preface assert
that “for practical purposes there is no better definition of a good style than Swift’s—
Proper Words in Proper Places.” Likewise, in the introduction of the 1895 edition of his
Principals of Rhetoric, he posits that “the foundations of Rhetoric rest upon grammar; for
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grammatical purity is a requisite of good writing” (1). Also, however, like the traditional
rhetoric teachers, Hill associated this freshman writing class with moral character:
“Harvard’s teachers regularly characterized their responses to student writing in moral
language. The most important duty of a composition teacher, Hill thought, was ‘to
prevent the young men and women under his eye from running to extremes’” (Crowley,
Composition 76). Thus, an emphasis on correctness and character largely constituted the
first required freshman English course.
As one can guess, however, the purpose of this class did not evolve seamlessly.
At the turn of the 19th century and shortly thereafter, the course itself received an
enormous amount of criticism. Many literature professors saw it as mind-numbing
drudgery and of no real value: “My own experiences with these courses,” North Carolina
professor George Strong notes, “was profitless. It was, in fact, enough to discourage me
from continuing the study of English. I failed to derive any benefit whatever from them”
(Connors, “Abolition” 51). Many professors, as we can see from Strong’s comments,
simply didn’t want to teach the course: it was not challenging or interesting to them. The
issues of correctness, it was often argued, should be taught at the secondary level, or in
preparatory schools. Indeed, the thinking of Thomas Lounsbury, who believed the course
should simply be abolished, was influential during this period. He held that “the idea that
expression could be taught was idiotic, the conception that college students could know
anything worth writing about silly, and the position that writing teachers could respond
usefully to student writing unlikely” (Connors, “Abolition” 50).
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As the roaring twenties approached, though, the educational philosophy of John
Dewey began to take hold. Dewey argued that the students’ lived experiences were in
fact a legitimate subject of study. His tenets largely rejected the focus on correctness as
put forth by A.S. Hill and his followers, but in a sense Dewey retained the moral
perspective by positing that social consciousness should be the foundation of all
education. He put forth the basic premise that
the school is primarily a social institution. Education being a social process, the
school is simply a form of community life in which all those agencies are
concentrated that will be most effective in bringing the child to share in the
inherited resources of the race, and to use his own powers for social ends
(Philosophy 445).
And like Paulo Freire’s critique of the banking method of education, Dewey suggests
there are two senses of the word learning: one where “truth exists ready-made
somewhere” and the student just passively draws on, defines, and interprets “what is in
storage” (Democracy 335). The other sense of learning “means something which the
individual does when he studies. It is an active, personally conducted affair” that involves
inquiry, discovery, and invention (335). He argued over and over again in favor of this
latter sense of learning and the notion that “learning in school should be continuous with
that out of school. There should be a free interplay between the two. [But] this is possible
only when there are numerous points of contact between the social interests of the one
and of the other” (Democracy 358). He suggested that the focal point, in fact, of
education should not be “science, nor literature, nor history, but the child’s own social
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activities,” his own experiences in the world (Philosophy 448). Indeed, it could be said
that the contemporary market for composition texts in many ways reflects Dewey’s belief
that “all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social
consciousness of the race” (Philosophy 443).
In contrast to Dewey’s thinking, however, and his influence on what has often
been referred to as the General Education movement, were the notions of people such as
Norman Foerster. Foerster felt that students had no idea what they needed and that it was
our duty, as teachers, to provide them with this knowledge. “If people were allowed to
choose what they wished to study,” Foerster contended, “they would always opt for
something other than what was best for them” (Crowley, Composition 165). He believed
that students were not at all inherently self-motivated and that they needed a great deal of
guidance and direction. Also at this time the onset of the Great Depression precipitated an
enormous increase of students entering American colleges and universities: “enrollments
had almost doubled between 1920 and 1930, from 598,000 students to more than 1.1
million” (Connors, “Abolition” 52). Clearly, staffing a course required for all students
during such an influx posed quite a challenge, and sentiments in favor of abolishing the
first-year writing course were strong during this period. Alvin Eurich, from the
University of Minnesota, suggested that teachers in several different fields collaborate
with each other to enhance students’ writing abilities. This was, in fact, one of the first
Writing Across the Curriculum proposals. Another, more accusatory voice, which called
for the eradication of the course, came from Oscar James Campbell, who espoused a
sense of literary elitism and offered that “composition cannot be taught apart from
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content, that it is intellectually dishonest as well as futile. [Campbell blamed] freshman
composition for teacher disaffection and for reducing the usefulness of literary
education” (Connors, “Abolition” 53). Attention to the first-year writing course largely
died down, however, as World War II approached and other concerns took priority.
That is not to say, though, that there was nothing interesting going on in the early
to mid 40s regarding the required composition class—and if anything, the focus on social
awareness and the student’s lived experiences maintained its hold. What John Heyda and
others have dubbed the “turf wars” between the fields of Communications and English
over the rights to Freshman Composition began to swell as the war ended. In 1945, for
instance, the University of Minnesota enacted a “communications skills” program “to
incorporate as many theoretical and pedagogical insights gleaned from new theories of
communication as was possible” (Crowley, Composition 179). In addition to utilizing
popular culture and popular media as important learning tools, “the designers of the
Minnesota program assumed that communication is a socially necessary activity and that
the primary function of language is to convey meaning […]. In other words, the
circulation of meaning was more important than the observance of correctness” (179).
Two other programs that were operating at this time illustrate the various social and
student-centered aims of these courses. At the State University of Iowa,
the purpose of the course was to help students develop study skills for
college success, to help them develop writing ability in ‘expository,
argumentative, and critical techniques,’ and to lead them to recognize bad
arguments and bias in discourse (especially in propaganda) […];
instruction was to be individualized, geared to ‘find out what the
individual student needs and then [to] adjust his progress accordingly.’[…]
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It was to be practical, providing lessons in ‘exposition, argument, and
criticism—the everyday and practical modes,’ not in belles letters, the
proper concern of literature and creative writing courses. (Berlin, Reality
97)
The program offered at the University of Denver provides an interesting comparison to
the one instituted at Iowa State. Denver espoused that “the skills of writing, speaking,
reading and listening were offered as tools for securing ‘the best possible adjustment of
the individual in the complex field of human relations’” (100). This course served
primarily as therapy for students. The terms clinics and clinicians were employed; indeed,
“‘work in the writing clinic [was] built upon the foundation of Rogerian nondirective
counseling’” (100). Writing here was seen as a purging process of sorts—if the student
was able to “write out his emotional conflicts, his difficulties with mama-papa, or his so
called ‘sins,’ he [would] help rid himself of the blockage of fear which comes from
inward festering” (103).
English departments, as we know, won the turf wars for the first-year writing
class. While John Heyda notes that Freshman composition and the field of Composition
both lost out when the field of Communications was extradited, freshman composition
teachers in the 1960s began to enjoy a bit more respect as the field of Composition gained
legitimacy. In addition, the civil rights movement and the political unrest that marked the
1960s spilled into many classrooms, and for a large number of freshman composition
teachers, “access to higher education was a basic right because literacy and democracy
were inseparable. If a student could find his or her way through the open door of the
university, then he or she could, with enough patience and diligence on everyone’s part,
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be taught to write” (Pullman 18). And as the 1960s progressed, as Robert Connors tells
us, “students began to demand more of a college education than mere assertion and
formulas. It was time for Relevance” (Composition-Rhetoric 105). In contrast to earlier
views of the role of Freshman writing such as those posited by Strong, Lounsbury,
Campbell, and Foerester, and more in keeping with the thinking proffered by Dewey,
students in these classes
were encouraged to write about personal experiences and political issues.
Style was now a matter of personal “voice.” Arrangement was organic
rather than regimented, and the five paragraph theme was replaced by
various genres. Spelling, punctuation, and grammar were taught, but only
incidentally. Invention became the primary focus of instruction, and
composition was explained as a legitimate method of knowledge creation
(as epistemic, in the jargon of the time). Composition teachers were no
longer editors and judges. Now they were coaches and fellow writers.
(Pullman19)
Also in the 60s and the two decades that followed, seminal scholarship in the field
of Composition was being produced, such as Janet Emig’s pioneer work in ethnography
and Linda Flowers and John Hayes’s research into cognitive psychology’s contribution to
the writing process. About this time the “importance of planning and problem solving
was being discovered, as was the fact that writing is ‘recursive’ or iterative rather than
linear” (20). The so-called Expressivists were finding listeners, and people like Kenneth
Bruffee and Peter Elbow were articulating notions of social construction and de-centered
classrooms. Elbow, in What is English, evaluated the 1987 English Coalition Conference,
a gathering intended as a follow-up to the 1966 Dartmouth Conference. In his critique,
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Elbow advises that perhaps what we need to do is ease up on trying so desperately to
answer such questions as “What is English?” and “What is our relation to literature?” and
consider that agreeing on one definition is not only improbable, but counterproductive.
He suggests that “English” has many different functions and many different purposes, but
perhaps it should primarily be “about making knowledge rather than about studying
already existing knowledge” (118). In lots of ways, these decades brought about “a
research agenda that continued to underwrite the writing-process theory of Composition
and the model of Freshman Composition that it informed” (Pullman 20).
All of this is by no means to say, however, that the purpose of the first-year
writing course had been settled and agreed upon. As Mina Shaughnessey outlines, new
open admissions policies in the 1970s brought about a variety of discontent and criticism,
including renewed calls for abolishing the class altogether. The 70s and early 80s also
brought with them, as Robert Connors defines it, a strong “‘Back to Basics’ movement”
which saw “progressive education as having failed” (Composition-Rhetoric 108). There
remains continued debate about the role of the composition class as a “service” course
and whether or not there should be some sort of common curriculum that the course
should follow across the country.
But “progressive education,” as it might be called, and a pedagogical perspective
rooted in the thinking of John Dewey with its focus on experience and social aims, has
not only survived but has overwhelmingly become the mantra of this class in colleges and
universities throughout the union. For years now, “‘Write what you know’ has been
perhaps the most common advice given to writers, and the movement towards writing
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assignments based in the personal has been the inevitable result of taking that dictum
seriously…” (Connors, Composition-Rhetoric 325). And the personal narrative
assignment, or asking students to write what they know, has often served to force
students to question what they know, and many educators have suggested that we should
not be shy in pressing our students to question what they know. In 1990, for instance,
Patricia Bizzell criticizes James Berlin for being too timid about persuading his writing
students towards his Marxist beliefs. “We must help our students,” she says, “to engage
in a rhetorical process that can collectively generate…knowledge and beliefs to displace
the repressive ideologies an unjust social order would prescribe…” (“Beyond” 670).
Likewise, Dale Bauer writes that “I would argue that political commitment—especially
feminist commitment—is a legitimate classroom strategy and rhetorical imperative”
(389). Calls for the inclusion of social consciousness in this class continue to be offered,
and I add my voice to the claim that such an approach is precisely what the purpose of the
first-year writing class should be. At the moment, however, we are ignoring one of the
most pressing social and political topics of our time.
Religious Belief as a Social and Political
Issue in the United States Today
If, in fact, we continue to take social responsibility and critical literacy as our
purpose in the composition class, we have no choice but to begin addressing religious
belief in a meaningful way. Just as there are tangible, communal consequences from our
beliefs about the color of someone’s skin or gender or sexual preference, so too are there
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tangible and communal consequences from our belief or disbelief in God. The basic
issue, of course, is not a new one. The intermingling of church and state has been the
subject of debate and discussion in the U. S. for quite some time. Despite the
Establishment Clause, which separates church and state, public policy in the U. S. has to
some degree always been driven by faith. For more than two centuries, though, the
Jeffersonian compromise—a compromise that relegated faith to the private sphere in
exchange for religious freedom—together with the Establishment Clause worked to
balance a very religious nation with its general desire for a secular government.
References to God appear on our money, on the walls of our Supreme Court, in our
anthems, ect., but this balancing act kept faith from encroaching too conspicuously into
the making of public policy. While presidential candidates, to various degrees, have
always had to be vocal about their faith (indeed, as Richard Rorty points out, “no
uncloseted atheist is likely to get elected anywhere in the country” (Philosophy and
Social Hope 169)), there was an understanding that once in office, the separation of
church and state should still be observed. Such an observance, of course, has not always
been strict. In recent years Ronald Reagan comes to mind, who “perceived the paroxysms
in the Middle East through the lens of biblical prophecy. He went so far as to include men
like Jerry Falwell and [Armageddon-advocate] Hal Lindsey in his national security
briefings” (Harris, The End 153). One could argue that including a man like Falwell in
national security briefings might, in some way, compromise the Jeffersonian
compromise. Since the Bush administration came to power in 2000, though, the country
has experienced an incredible and unprecedented influx of religious belief into all three
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branches of our federal government. In the last five or six years religion in this country
has driven public policy in such a way that demands our immediate attention in the
socially conscious composition class.
I take as my starting point the U.S. Supreme Court decision Bush v. Gore in 2000.
The majority opinion was written by Justice Antonin Scalia—arguably one of the greatest
legal minds in the country—and it has since been almost unanimously described as
having no basis whatsoever in logic, let alone in legal precedent. As Alan Dershowitz
notes, there have been worse decisions rendered by this court throughout its history, but
never has there been a decision so inconsistent with the legal philosophy of its authors.
This case was different from the likes of Dred Scott v. Sanford (which held blacks were
not citizens and thus had no rights), Plessy v. Ferguson (which outlined the
discriminatory “separate but equal” doctrine), and Bradwell v. State (which held women
had no right to be lawyers) because in this case, “the majority justices violated their own
previously declared judicial principles—principles they still believe in and will apply in
other cases” (174). As reprehensible as they may have been, the decisions in cases like
Dred Scott were nonetheless in keeping with the judges’ previous legal opinions and
previous interpretations of the Constitution. “In this respect,” Dershowitz argues, Bush v.
Gore “may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history,
because it is the only one that I know of where the majority justices decided as they did
because of the personal identity and political affiliation of the litigants” (174).
Much has been written on why these judges decided as they did. There is no doubt
that this decision did much to destroy the Court’s reputation, but there has been a lot of
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speculation as to why each of the five Justices signed on. The primary author of this
decision, Justice Scalia, is a devout Catholic, and the extent to which he believes his faith
should propel public policy can be gleaned from the following:
The reaction of people of faith to this tendency of democracy to obscure the
divine authority behind government should not be resignation to it, but the
resolution to combat it as effectively as possible. We have done that in this
country (and continental Europe has not) by preserving in our public life many
visible reminders that—in the words of a Supreme Court opinion from the
1940s—“we are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.”…All this, as I say, is most unEuropean, and helps explain why our people
are more inclined to understand, as Saint Paul did, that government carries the
sword as “the minister of God” to “execute wrath” upon the evildoer. (19)
One might respond to this line of thinking by arguing that contemporary Europe avoids
too much religious sentiment in the public sphere because it has had much more
experience than the U.S with the consequences of God and government as one unified
entity. Be that as it may, it’s worth noting that Scalia’s record as a Supreme Court Justice
aligns almost perfectly with his deeply-held religious beliefs. In the same speech, for
example, he describes his position on the death penalty:
This is not the Old Testament, I emphasize, but St. Paul….[T]he core of his
message is that government—however you want to limit that concept—derives its
moral authority from God…Indeed, it seems to me that the more Christian a
country is the less likely it is to regard the death penalty as immoral…I attribute
that to the fact that, for the believing Christian, death is no big deal. Intentionally
killing an innocent person is a big deal: it is a grave sin, which causes one to lose
his soul. But losing this life, in exchange for the next?...For the nonbeliever, on
the other hand, to deprive a man of his life is to end his existence. What a horrible
act! (18).
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In 1989 Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion (Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U S 361)
which upheld as constitutional the death penalty for juvenile offenders (we are, it’s worth
remembering, the only industrialized western nation that still puts adult criminals to
death, to say nothing of teenagers). When this decision was reversed in Roper v.
Simmons in 2005, he wrote a scathing dissent, accusing the majority, among other things,
of acknowledging the overwhelming body of international law and opinions on this
matter from the rest of the western world (543 U S 551). My point here is not to agree or
disagree with Scalia’s approach, but simply to argue that if his faith is a clear motivation
for the policy he sets, then educators have the social responsibility to explore that faith in
the writing class. And with the recent additions of Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—two
men who appear to hold the same faith as Scalia and perhaps the same understanding of
its role in government—that responsibility is only heightened.
In the legislative branch, our majority leaders in Congress not only agree with
Scalia that their religion has a right to propel public policy, but they have been vocal in
arguing that the federal courts in general have become dangerously too secular and
grossly offensive to people of faith. In April, 2005, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist’s
videotaped remarks headlined a rally entitled “Justice Sunday: Stopping the Filibuster
against People of Faith.” The rally, which was broadcast from a church in Kentucky and
which reached approximately 61 million households, was sponsored by the Family
Research Council, a conservative Christian organization that works to “shape public
debate and formulate public policy…” (1). Before Frist spoke, Tony Perkins, the
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president of the FRC, argued that “Democrats were using filibusters to exclude religious
believers from the bench” and, holding up a Bible, added, “what we are saying tonight is
that as American citizens, we should not have to choose between believing what is in this
book and serving the public” (CNN.com). Frist was careful himself to avoid overtly
religious language, but his message was just as clear: he and his Republican party would
fight for faith in the public sphere. Frist has been consistent. Two years earlier, over the
same filibuster issue, he and other high-ranking Republican Senators invited the Family
Research Council, Focus on the Family, the Southern Baptist Convention, and other
conservative faith-based groups to Washington where, with “virtually unfettered access
to the Capitol building,” they “conducted prayer circles and press conferences throughout
the wee hours” (Kaplan 245). Bill Frist was among those in the Family Research Council
prayer circle, from which Tony Perkins again addressed the nation: “we have volunteered
to be here tonight to keep watch while most of America sleeps…we are here because
there is a clear and present danger facing America—an out-of-control judiciary that is
chipping away at religious liberties in this nation” (245). More recently, Frist, together
with House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (who has since been arrested and forced to
resign his position), spoke to evangelical leaders about how best to deal with this
judiciary problem. There was serious talk about simply eliminating “troublesome” courts
altogether. After Frist and Delay’s speech, James Dobson, from the California faith-based
group Focus on the Family, noted that “very few people know…that the Congress can
simply disenfranchise a court. They don’t have to fire anybody or impeach them or go
through that battle. All they have to do is say the Ninth Circuit doesn’t exist anymore,
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and it’s gone” (Phillips 245-46). Along these lines, Delay had previously argued, “We set
up the courts. We can unset the courts” (246).
Delay, in fact, has been less inhibited than Frist about voicing his views for a
faith-based government. “God is using me all the time,” he has said, “everywhere, to
stand up for a Biblical world view in everything that I do and everywhere I am. He is
training me” (Philips 216). He has also specifically claimed that “Only Christianity offers
a way to live in response to the realities that we find in this world. Only Christianity”
(Harris 156). In reference to the Second Coming, Delay displayed a poster on his office
wall which read, “This Could Be The Day” (156). As Kevin Phillips notes, it was just this
perspective that left “GOP political strategists [with] no desire for a far-reaching debate
on either global warming or peak oil. The religious right had its own rapture
chronometers and apocalypse monitors reporting how many months, days, and hours
remained” (96). I could certainly fill up a number of pages by citing the faith-based
perspectives from which so many members of Congress work, but I’ll defer here to an apt
summation by Phillips:
…in 2004 all seven of the top Republican leaders in the U.S. Senate, starting with
Majority Leader Bill Frist of Tennessee and working down to Senator George
Allen of Virginia, chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee,
boasted 100 percent ratings from the Christian Coalition, founded by Pat
Robertson in the wake of his 1988 presidential bid. (216)
Before I move to the executive branch and into the country at large, however, I do want
to touch on one of those “top seven” that Phillips refers to, Rick Santorum. Before he lost
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his bid for re-election in 2006, Santorum ranked number three; had he won, he would
have moved to number two. Sean Reilly, one of Santorum’s aids who now works as a
political consultant, has said that “Rick Santorum is a Catholic missionary…That’s what
he is. He’s a Catholic missionary who happens to be in the Senate” (Sokolove 58). There
is little doubt that he is on a mission. As Senator Susan Collins notes, “…he believes
there should be more of an intertwining of government and religion, and he believes it
passionately” (61). Santorum has consistently argued that “to completely separate moral
views from public life…is a dangerous thing” (61). “How is it possible,” he asks, “to
believe in the existence of God yet refuse to express outrage when his moral code is
flouted? How is it possible that there exists so little space in the public square for the
standards that follow from belief in a transcendent God?” (61).
I address in my Conclusion Santorum’s implication that morality must necessarily
flow from a belief in God, but I want again to remind my readers now that my argument
here is not for or against faith in the public sphere (this discussion as well will be raised
in the last chapter), nor is it to decipher whether or not the public officials I cite are
sincere about their beliefs—the fact that they proclaim them so often is the point. Faith is
overtly awash in public policy-making, and thus requires our attention in the critical
composition class. Having said that, I turn my attention to some of the momentum that
has perhaps set in motion much of what I’ve described in this section so far. While there
are certainly more than a few different opinions on what role faith should play at the
governing level, most observers from both ends of the political spectrum agree that our
country has never before seen such an intermingling of the two. As I mentioned earlier,
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faith has always played some sort of role in presidential campaigns and politics at large.
Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan’s initial appeals to the southern
religious right, as well as Pat Robertson’s presidential bid in 1988, come to mind from
the latter half of the century. As the millennium approached, however, despite their surge
to impeach Bill Clinton, the Christian Coalition—the emblem and core of the Christian
right in this country—found itself on the defensive. IRS and FEC investigations were
beginning to tarnish the Coalition’s image, and groups like the afore-mentioned Family
Research Council had yet to make an impact on the national scene. In February, 1999,
Paul Weyrich, a key inspirational figure for Jerry Fallwell’s “moral majority,” wrote the
following in a highly publicized letter: “I no longer believe that there is a moral
majority…. We got our people elected. But that did not result in the adoption of our
agenda.” His advice was to “drop out of this culture” which had become “an ever
widening sewer” and “find places…where we can live godly, righteous, and sober lives”
(Kaplan 1-2). As Esther Kaplan notes, at this point in time, with “a booming Christian
home schooling movement and rising enrolment in fundamentalist Christian colleges,
many saw [Weyrich’s] letter as a harbinger of a new evangelical separatism, marked by a
retreat from public life” (2).
As George Bush jockeyed for the Republican nomination, though, this attitude
began to change. Frequent public and bold pronouncements like “I’ve heard the call—I
believe God wants me to run for President” coupled with an unprecedented, relentless
pursuit for the support of the evangelical and Christian right resulted in the following
statistic: of all the votes for George Bush in 2000, 52% of them came from white
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evangelicals and the “most religiously observant Catholics” in the country (Kaplan 3).
Again in Kaplan’s words, “The Christian right is not just another special interest group,
like the NRA. This is Bush’s base” (3). And this appeal to the most faithful among us
only grew once Bush took office. He immediately withdrew federal funds for clinics in
the developing world that had anything to do with sex education or abortion, created his
executive Faith-Based and Community Initiatives which funneled millions of dollars to
Pat Robertson and other prominent Christian leaders, and across the board appointed
Christian activists to head Federal institutes and administrations, including NASA, the
FDA, and dozens of others. Of these appointments, his choice of John Ashcroft for
Attorney General was especially noteworthy. By all accounts a Pentecostal
fundamentalist, and in many ways described as a “religious warrior with politics more
appropriate to 17th century Salem, Mass—or late-1990s Kandahar—than to [a] secular
democracy,” Ashcroft fought vociferously in Missouri to impede the Civil Rights
Movement as he strongly believes that slavery and racism are not sins according to the
Bible (Huberman14). He has often remarked, in the same vein as Delay, Scalia,
Santorum, and so many other public officials, that “we are a nation called to defend
freedom—freedom that is not the grant of any government, but is our endowment from
God” (Harris 154). In his role as U.S. Attorney General, soon after the 9/11 attacks, he
proposed that “Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for
him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you” (Kaplan 19). Also
after 9/11, and also in his capacity as our country’s most powerful lawyer, Ashcroft
argued that our fight against global terrorism
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is a defense of our freedom in the most profound sense: it is the defense of our
right to make moral choices—to seek fellowship with God…it is a conflict
between those who believe that God grants us choice and those who seek to
impose their choices on us. It is a conflict between inspiration and imposition, the
way of peace and the way of destruction and chaos. It is a conflict between good
and evil. And as President Bush has reminded us, we know that God is not neutral
between the two. (19)
Ashcroft proved to hold some insight regarding Bush’s approach to what was now
being termed as our war on terror. When Bob Woodward asked him if he had consulted
his father before invading Iraq, Bush responded, “You know, he is the wrong father to
appeal to in terms of strength…there is a higher father that I appeal to” (Woodward 421).
In a meeting with Israel’s Ariel Sharon and Palestine’s new Prime Minister Mahmoud
Abbas, Abbas recounts that Bush said “god told me to strike at al-Qaeda and I struck
them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am
determined to solve the problem in the Middle East” (9). Jeffrey S. Siker, a highly-
regarded Catholic theologian, notes that in general “we have had other ‘religious’
presidents…but no other president has so clearly perceived his calling in such epic
biblical terms.” In the same article, Siker goes on to add that Bush “sees America as a
kind of new Israel called by God to be God’s people on the international stage,” and that
through his born-again experience he “now has a clear vision of what is morally right and
wrong,” a vision which, not unlike Scalia’s, holds that “some people simply deserve the
wrathful judgment of God, and if God chooses to use him as the vehicle of punishment,
so be it…whether for death row inmates in Texas or for governments such as Iraq” (1).
Lt. General William Boykin, one of the more powerful emissaries of this divine vision,
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attracted some attention with remarks he made at a Good Shepard Community Church in
Oregon. Boykin, a deputy undersecretary of defense who Bush (and Donald Rumsfeld)
placed in charge of hunting down Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, told his
audience that George Bush was
in the White House because God put him there for such a time as this. God put
him there to lead not only this nation but to lead the world, in such a time as
this…. The enemy is a spiritual enemy. It’s called the principality of
darkness…the battle this nation is in is a spiritual battle, it’s a battle for our soul.
And the enemy is a guy called Satan…Satan wants to destroy this nation. He
wants to destroy us a nation and he wants to destroy us as a Christian army. I’m
here on a recruiting trip. I’m here asking you to join this army. (Kaplan 21)
In a New York Times article, Bob Herbert notes that on another occasion Boykin
declared that the war could only be won “if we come at them in the name of Jesus,” and
that in another speech, “referring to a Muslim fighter in Somalia, the General said, ‘Well,
you know what I knew—that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real
God, and his was an idol’” (Herbert A21). Boykin’s remarks drew so much media
attention that eventually he was reassigned; but he was in no way reprimanded—his
superiors never gave the impression that his views were really all that out of line.
The role that religion has played in the development of this Administration’s
foreign policy has proved interesting as well regarding our relationship with Europe.
Since he took office, George Bush has only been able to forge a strong rapport with
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a man who shares Bush’s born-again experience and
who is also very public about his faith. As Bill Keller has suggested, “it is probably not
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entirely irrelevant to our international relations that…Jacques Chirac of France and
Gerhard Schroder of Germany are adamantly secular” (Kaplan 10). And although
obviously from the other side of the isle, Tom Daschle speaks to this point more directly
in his recent book Like No Other Time. Increasingly dismayed about our relations with
our allies since 2000, Daschle writes that Tony Blair had recently offered “to act as an
intermediary for the U.S. in shoring up our relations with our European allies. Since
when, I asked, did we need a liaison with Europe? This fact alone, I asserted, spoke
volumes about the effect of President Bush’s foreign policy” (100). Blair’s response to
the London bombings in July of 2005, in fact, struck an all too familiar chord and served
as a telling example of our own agenda abroad. In his first major speech after these
attacks, Blair proclaimed that “true religious faith and true legitimate politics” were
necessary to “defeat this threat.” He added that “what we are confronting here is an evil
ideology,” and that “their cause is not founded on an injustice…It is founded on a belief,
one whose fanaticism is such it can’t be moderated. It can’t be remedied. It has to be
stood up to” (Cowell A8). These remarks are eerily similar to those that North American
audiences hear from George Bush on a regular basis, and one can almost imagine these
exact same words being uttered from those who have been attacked over the years by the
United States and United Kingdom alike.
Making the case that we now live in a full-blown theocracy in the United States
is becoming easier and easier to do. Bill Moyers, an ordained Baptist minister, recently
told the Harvard medical school that “one of the biggest changes in politics in my
lifetime is that the delusional is no longer marginal. It has come in from the fringe, to sit
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in the seat of power in the Oval Office and in Congress. For the first time in our history,
ideology and theology hold a monopoly of power in Washington” (Phillips xv).
Commenting on what this means, David Domke notes that the “Bush administration’s
worldview is one grounded in religious fundamentalism—that is, it emphasizes absolutes,
authority, and tradition, and a divine hand in history and upon the United States. Such a
worldview is disastrous for a democratic system” (171). And these are by no means
selected opinions from the “left.” Paul O’Neill, Bush’s treasury secretary for years, has
recently argued that faith and ideology served as the basis for policy-making in the Bush
White House. He notes that “Ideology is a lot easier, because you don’t have to know
anything or search for anything…you already know the answer to everything. It’s not
penetrable by facts” (Kaplan 12). Kevin Phillips, who I have cited before and who was
instrumental in bringing about the southern faith-based GOP in the 1960s, has recently
concluded that “the last two presidential elections mark the transformation of the GOP
into the first religious party in US history” (vii). To help support this claim Phillips
quotes, among hundreds of others, chief Washington representative of the Southern
Baptist Convention Richard Land: “George Bush is an evangelical Christian, there is no
doubt about that. The president’s evangelicalism means he believes in the truth of the
Bible, with a capital T: the virgin birth, the death of Christ on the cross for our sins, the
physical resurrection, and most important, a personal relationship with Jesus”(171).
Those who are looking for a Presidential bid in 2008 have of course been
taking notes. During his 2000 campaign, Senator John McCain called Jerry Falwell and
Pat Robertson “agents of intolerance,” but in May of 2006 McCain will be the
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commencement speaker at Falwell’s Liberty University (a university that at the moment
boasts the best college debate team in the country, for as Falwell urges, “our football
program can’t change the culture…our debate team can…our goal is to create an army of
people who know how to make our case” (Chafets 52)). In the past Fallwell has argued
that Jews cannot go to heaven, that we should “blow [the terrorists] all away in the name
of the Lord,” and that “the pagans, the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and
the lesbians…the A.C.L.U….all of them who have tried to secularize America—I point
the finger in their face and say, ‘you helped [Sept. 11] happen’” (Krugman A21).
Regarding education, Fallwell has also said, “I hope to see the day when…we won’t have
any public schools. The churches will have taken them over again and Christians will be
running them. What a happy day that will be” (ReligiousTolerance.org 2). Such opinions
likely fueled McCain’s assertion in 2000, but he has obviously changed his tune. Paul
Krugman of the New York Times notes that McCain “obviously believes that he can’t get
the Republican nomination without Mr. Falwell’s approval” and in part he supports this
comment with McCain’s own words on the subject: “I believe that the Christian right has
a major role to play in the Republican Party. One reason is because they’re so active and
they’re followers are” (Krugman).
The religious pulse of the nation hasn’t been completely lost on the Democrats,
either. As Howard Dean was about to become chairman of the Democratic party, Anne
Kornblut writes in the New York Times that he “said Democrats had the real claim on
religious values because of their commitment to help the poor and the afflicted.” The
same article quotes Dr. Dean as saying, “when you think of the New Testament, [the
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Republicans] get about 2 of the values and we get about 27” (Kornblut). Positioning
herself for the Democratic nomination in 2008, Hillary Clinton has started to tap into
America’s faith. In response to a recent Border Protection and Illegal Immigration bill
proposed by Bill Frist in the Senate, Clinton stated that “it is certainly not in keeping with
my understanding of the Scripture because this bill would literally criminalize the Good
Samaritan and probably even Jesus himself” (Bernstein). The proposed bill has attracted
a lot of attention, especially from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. In
particular, Roger Mahony, the cardinal archbishop of Los Angeles, instructed his
parishioners to oppose the bill because, in part, it would “subject to five years in prison
anyone who ‘assists’ an undocumented immigrant to ‘remain in the United States’”
(Mahony A29). Cardinal Mahony is pushing for more comprehensive immigration
reform, arguing that “providing humanitarian assistance to those in need should not be
made a crime” and reminding us that “current law does not require social service
agencies to obtain evidence of legal status before rendering aid, nor should it. Denying
aid to a fellow human being violates a law with a higher authority than Congress—the
law of God” (A29). In this particular article, Mahony makes some compelling arguments
to further his cause, and concludes by saying “the church is compelled to take a stand
against harmful legislation and to work towards positive change” (A29).
Whether one agrees with Frist or Clinton or Mahony on how to address our
pressing need for immigration reform, there’s not much doubt that faith dictates much of
the debate, and it will continue to do so in the wake of the 2006 congressional elections.
Frist bowed out for a possible presidential bid, and others like Rick Santorum are no
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longer there. By no means, however, does this indicate that the influence of religion upon
the political scene has diminished. As David Kuo notes in his New York Times article
“Putting Faith Before Politics,” the “religious right” has maintained its influence, and
what we saw in November 2006 was that “its members are beginning to migrate to the
Democratic party. The statistic that is exciting Democrats the most is that nearly 30% of
white evangelicals, the true Republican base, voted Democrat” (1). Kuo warns that
Democrats shouldn’t get overly excited as it is unclear where conservative Christians like
himself will eventually commit. What is for certain, he argues, is that they will continue
to be a force. Likewise, as Alan Cooperman writes in the Washington Post, whether
Democrats are correct in claiming that they appealed to more people of faith or whether
Republicans are correct in claiming that religious voters chose to stay home this time,
either way religious faith helped produce the outcome (A01).
When I began this section I argued that faith has recently moved from the private
to the public sphere in such a way that demands our attention in the writing class. I have
tried to illustrate this move by highlighting a few of our prominent government officials,
but theirs is by no means the only sector in which this move has taken place. With
varying degrees of success, for example, public school boards across the country (most
prominently in Kansas and Pennsylvania) have recently worked to include the theory of
intelligent design as an option to Darwinism in biology classes. There have been a
multitude of high profile and low profile contests over the display of religious scripture
on government ground (whether it be in a courthouse in Alabama or in a National Park in
Arizona). Not only has faith been a mainstay in the headlines, but almost every Sunday in
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recent memory the topic of God or faith accounts for about one third of the New York
Times Book Review weekly Best Seller list (this morning, Sunday April 9, 2006, five of
the fifteen listed dealt with faith: American Theocracy, Misquoting Jesus, Left to Tell (a
Rwandan genocide survivor’s tale of finding God), Eat, Pray, Love, and What Jesus
Meant). And on a much more local level, when I drive to school I pass a number of
churches whose signs often display advice such as “bring your family to church, and
bring your church to the world,” or “devote yourself to the public reading of scripture 1
Timothy 4:13.” There is an undeniably powerful religious current—and reaction to that
current—that’s “in the air” right now in this country. In fact, as Stephen Carter argues in
his widely influential book The Culture of Disbelief, “the battle for the public square is
already over. The rhetoric of religion is simply there…the question crying out most
vitally for resolution, given the presence of religions in the public square, is whether and
how to regulate that presence” (101). Carter appears to have struck a chord when he
writes, “we often ask our citizens to split their public and private selves, telling them in
effect that it is fine to be religious in private, but there is something askew when those
private beliefs become the basis for public action” (8). He adds that we make a great error
when “we insist that the devout keep their religious ideas—whether good or bad—to
themselves” (10). Touching on this same sentiment that has resounded with millions and
millions of Americans, Jim Wallis—a powerful evangelical leader who strongly opposed
our war in Iraq—urges in his best-selling book God’s Politics that “God is personal, but
never private” (31). He argues that
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if we look, really look into our biblical and other holy texts, we find a god who
speaks about ‘politics’ all the time, about what believing in God means in this
world (not just the next one), about faith and ‘public life’ (not just private piety),
about our responsibilities for the common good (not just for our own religious
experience). And here’s the big news: the politics of God calls all the rest of our
politics into question. (32)
The calls of Carter and Wallis are beginning to find an audience in the world of
academia as well. In his recent online article “One University Under God?” Stanley Fish
writes, “In every sector of American life, religion is transgressing the boundary between
private and public and demanding to be heard in precincts that only a short while ago
would have politely shown it the door” (3). Fish notes that the history of religion and
“courses like ‘The Bible as Literature’ and ‘The American Puritan Experience’ have been
staples in the curriculum for a long time,” but that things are starting to change. “It is one
thing,” he argues, “to take religion as an object of study and another to take religion
seriously. To take religion seriously would be to regard it not as a phenomenon to be
analyzed at arm’s length, but as a candidate for the truth” (4). Negotiating ways that we
can “take religion seriously” in the writing class—something we have to start doing—is a
central aim of this study.
The Fear of God…
Giving up control in the classroom is not always the easiest thing for a teacher to
do—and talking about faith has all the earmarks of loosing control. Inviting the
unpredictable is often hard, frustrating, and stressful work. I suspect that most of us
would agree, though, that while it hasn’t always gone smoothly, broaching topics like
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race and gender has been a rewarding endeavor. Often the hard part is asking our students
(and ourselves) to question our habits and reexamine our beliefs. It’s useful to remember,
though, that in the context of the writing class, initial chaos is not necessarily a bad thing.
Teachers who have taught long enough, I believe, come to understand that some of the
most genuine learning moments come from giving students freedom to explore, to
imagine, and to question. Sometimes allowing this kind of freedom means relinquishing
control, but as Ann Berthoff tells us, in many ways that’s how meaning is made.
“Meanings don’t come out of the air,” she writes, “we make them out of a chaos of
images, half-truths, remembrances, syntactic fragments, from the mysterious and
unformed” (70). Chaos, Berthoff argues, is in fact essential to the writing process: “The
first use of language that a student of composition has to learn, I think, is in the
generation of chaos. If we don’t begin there, we falsify the composition process because
composition requires choosing all along the way, and you can’t choose if there are no
perceived alternatives: chaos is the source of alternatives” (75). If we don’t allow our
students to grapple with faith from the start, we limit their ability to choose in this regard
and we also hamper that initial chaotic, ambiguous moment to which Berthoff refers.
“Our students cannot learn the uses of chaos,” she adds, “if we continue to make
assignments appropriate not to these beginnings but to the final phases of the composing
process” (70). With respect to taking on religion in the writing class, Berthoff’s advice
couldn’t be more appropriate. We must at the outset permit our students to choose from
their bag of chaos—a bag which contains their faith in all of its slippery, contagious, and
undefined forms—when they attempt to invent, compose, and make meaning. Later in the
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process we can work with them to sculpt and define (and, I will argue, put into practice
the pragmatic theory I’ll outline in the next chapter). Letting go of the reins in the
beginning, though, isn’t easy. “Chaos is scary,” Berthoff acknowledges, but what “we
must realize ourselves and make dramatically evident to our students is what I. A.
Richards means when he calls ambiguities ‘the hinges of thought’” (71).
I. A. Richards’ understanding of ambiguity is certainly useful here as well. Most
of us are conditioned to see ambiguity as something to be avoided or refined. There is a
premium on precision and clarity. Like Berthoff, however, Richards argues for the
importance of the ambiguous: “where the old Rhetoric treated ambiguity as a fault in
language, and hoped to confine or eliminate it, the new Rhetoric sees it as an inevitable
consequence of the powers of language and as the indispensable means of most of our
most important utterances—especially in Poetry and Religion” (40). Those of us who
take a Reader Response approach to teaching reading and writing might relate this notion
of ambiguity to that third space or that “live circuit set up between reader and text” where
“the reader infuses intellectual and emotional meanings into the pattern of verbal
symbols, and those symbols channel his thoughts and feelings” (Rosenblatt 24). And
Rosenblatt’s argument suggests that emotions and feelings play as much a part in making
meaning as the intellect—emotions and feelings, of course, not the intellect, are the
providence of faith. As writing teachers we might prefer to focus on the intellect (it’s less
scary, more manageable), but Rosenblatt is not alone in arguing that it takes both our
hearts as well as our minds to make meaning. John Dewey often criticized the way in
which the education process separated the two, and that doing so resulted in a debilitating
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lack of interest on the part of both student and teacher (Democracy, 335). Likewise,
Susanne Langer stressed that our minds were equally made up of thought and feeling. If
we take this approach to making meaning, it seems almost impossible to address emotion
and feeling without considering faith.
Imagination comes into play here as well. Just as we might understand faith as
rooted more in our emotions than our logic, it can also certainly be understood as an
exercise in imagination. Rosenblatt tells us that what emerges from that “live circuit” or
that third space between reader and text is an “imaginative experience” (24). In other
words, meaning making is imaginative. In the same vein, Salman Rushdie argues that
“waking as well as sleeping, our response to the world is essentially imaginative” (377).
Regarding the writing class in particular, Ann Berthoff argues that “if we are to avail
ourselves of that incomparable resource, the minds of our students, we will have to know
what we’re looking for, to have some philosophically sound idea of the power the mind
promises. I believe that for teachers of composition, such a philosophy of mind is best
thought of as a theory of imagination” (64). In essence, she argues that we need to
“reclaim imagination as the forming power of mind” because it has so often and so
consistently been relegated to “the affective domain” as opposed to the “the cognitive
domain” (64). Like John Dewey, Berthoff sees this dichotomy as false and destructive.
Instead she suggests a more unifying and indispensable understanding of the word: “A
good name for the mind in action is imagination” (74).
The words “emotion,” “feeling,” and “imagination” don’t generally send
contemporary composition teachers running for the hills. On the contrary, these are
44
usually considered to be good things in the writing process. Religion and God, however,
are not quite as welcome, although in many ways they are tied up with all three of those
other words. Even though we don’t know where any of these things will lead us or our
students, religious belief in particular gives us the jitters because of all the dogmatic
baggage it carries and because there are no clear guidelines for how to deal with this
issue. We now feel relatively comfortable with race, class, and gender (and to some
extent sexual identity) because they have been theorized and problematized in the context
of the writing class. My project is to do the same with religious faith by outlining how the
Pragmatists can help us locate strategies for making religious belief a manageable subject
of inquiry in the composition class.
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CHAPTER III
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF
A philosophy is characterized more by
the formulation of its problems than by
its solution to them. Its answers establish an
edifice of facts; but its questions make the frame
in which its picture of facts is plotted…In our
questions lie our principles of analysis
Susanne Langer
In this chapter, I will primarily discuss the work of Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey. Much of their thinking can be traced to the work of
Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose name will come up now and again, and I will also draw a
bit upon the contemporary Pragmatists Cornel West and Richard Rorty. I focus, however,
on Peirce, James and Dewey not only because they were the primary authors of this
particular approach, but because these men were educators (especially Dewey) who spent
a great deal of their energy on the issue of religion (especially James). After the
Enlightenment and the thinking of philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant
relegated theology to a more or less emotional, aesthetic, and moral sphere apart from
scientific inquiry, European theologians in the nineteenth century continued to find
themselves on the sidelines and in the shadows of philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche,
Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill. Such was not the case in America, however. As Cornel
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West tells us, “religious concerns loomed large in the first significant American
philosophical response to modernity. The first generation of American Pragmatists,
especially Charles Peirce and William James, attempted not only to demythologize
modern science, but also to update religion” (West, Reader 361). In fact, as West
succinctly puts it, “nowhere in the modern world did philosophers take religion more
seriously than in the United States between 1900 and 1940” (361). As a scientist and one
of America’s most influential philosophers, Peirce wrote extensively on religion,
including essays I’ll take up later like “Evolutionary Love” and “The Concept of God,”
where he often placed a premium on faith by suggesting that we rely more in life on
vague intuitions than on the precision of reason. In the work of James, understood by
many as the “greatest psychologist of his day,” we find books such as Talks to Teachers
and The Varieties of Religious Experience; as Bennett Ramsey argues, “the nature of
James’ work overall…finds its whither and its whence in a developing understanding and
an increasingly strong avowal of the human person as a religiously bounded self” (3). In
the philosophy of John Dewey, a towering figure who for the better part of a century
transformed our understanding of the education process, we find books like A Common
Faith in which he grapples with the definition of religion as well as why and how we
employ it. Again from Cornel West, “for American Pragmatists, religious beliefs were
not simply practical postulates for moral behavior, pietistic modes of self-consciousness,
pictorial representations of absolute knowledge or anxiety-ridden self-involving choices.
Religious beliefs were on the same spectrum as any other beliefs—always linked to
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experience” (Reader 361). In short, these educators took religion seriously, and their
insights here could prove invaluable for us in the present-day writing class.
A Popular Misconception of Pragmatism
In his book The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (a book
that has been on and off the New York Times Best Seller list now for over a year), Sam
Harris takes the all-too common position that Pragmatism is merely the most persuasive
and prominent form of relativism. He claims that “if we ever hope to reach a global
consensus on matters of ethics—if we would say, for instance, that stoning women for
adultery is really wrong, in some absolute sense—we must find deep reasons to reject
pragmatism” (179). To support this claim, Harris argues that the pragmatic method holds
that “to call a statement ‘true’ is merely to praise it for how it functions in some area of
discourse; it is not to say anything about how it relates to the universe at large” (179).
Harris argues that there are, in fact, general truths to be known about the way the world
is, and to suggest (as he sees the Pragmatists suggesting) that you can’t actually be
“right” about anything and that one should only focus on the usefulness of a belief in a
particular context leads, inevitably, to disastrous results—especially when it comes to
faith. He offers the following example: “If a literalist reading of the Bible works for you
on Sundays, while agnosticism about God is better suited to Mondays at the office, there
is no reason to worry about the resulting contradictions in your worldview” (180). This is
a misreading of the Pragmatists, for at its core Pragmatism works to negotiate through
our contradictions rather than ignore them or accept them.
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While Harris is right about their rejection of resounding universal truths, he fails
to recognize a crucial step in that the aim of their method is to reconcile the consequences
of all our particular beliefs so as to enhance human happiness. This approach is grounded
in a responsibility to people, not to finding an ultimate Truth. At the heart of pragmatism
lies this question: “What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion
rather than that notion were true?” (James, Pragmatism 23). That is, “the pragmatic
method …is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical
consequences” (23). C.S. Pierce, often cited as the founding father of American
Pragmatism, argues that in attempting to trace such consequences in order to find truth,
we must understand that what we know to be true about something derives from the sum
of the effects that that something has had upon us. The sole purpose of “thought,” Peirce
holds, “is to produce belief,” and belief “involves the establishment in our nature of a rule
of action, or say for short, a habit” (Ideas 292). It’s the practical consequences of our
actions and our habits that generate our beliefs, our truths, and our understanding of what
works for us in our lives. But the key is that we need to square up all of our truths with all
of our other truths. It’s like a system of checks and balances based on our experience in
the world—flying airplanes into buildings or torturing gay men might work or be “true”
from a particular theological perspective, but these actions don’t stack up against most of
what else we know to be true from our experiences in this world. Or to take Harris’
example about vacillating between an inerrant interpretation of the Bible on Sunday and
an agnostic approach to the world on Monday—it’s our duty, the Pragmatists argue, to
examine and then reconcile the consequences and contradictions resulting from these
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beliefs (in other words, each notion is only as good as our other notions permit). As
James writes, “If theological ideas prove to have value for concrete life, they will be true,
for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are
true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be
acknowledged” (Pragmatism 35).
In his critique of the Pragmatists, Harris singles out Richard Rorty as offering
“considerable shelter to the shades of relativism” (179). Rorty has been pretty clear on
this point, though. “I do not think,” he argues, “that denying that there are ‘the correct
standards’ should lead anybody to say that truth (as opposed to justification) is ‘relative’
to something” (Critics 11). The only reason one would make this leap, he suggests, is if
one were trying to justify to others that his beliefs were True in some universal sense.
This is not Rorty’s aim, nor is it, as I outlined above, the aim of Pragmatism. For
example, in response to the work of Albrecht Wellmer, Rorty says, “we agree that one
reason to prefer democracies is that they enable us to construct ever bigger and better
contexts of discussion. But I stop there, and Wellmer goes on. He adds that this reason is
not just a justification of democracy for us, but ‘a justification, period” (13). Rorty
suggests that for a Pragmatist Wellmer’s thinking is “like trying to tell whether I think of
my scalpel or my computer as ‘a good tool for this task’ or as a ‘good tool, period” (13).
Relativism, then, is an entirely different kind of animal than Pragmatism. Although both
might be said to maintain that there are no absolute or universal truths, relativism is still
beholden to an abstract “truth” even though that truth might vary from place to place or
from culture to culture. As Rorty tells us, though, a Pragmatist would argue that “our
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responsibility to Truth, or to Reason, must be replaced by talk about our responsibility to
our fellow human beings” (Social Hope 148). We do not have a “responsibility to get
things right. Rather, it is a responsibility to ourselves to make our beliefs cohere with one
another, and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with theirs” (149). Examining
the consequences of our beliefs in a particular context so that we put ourselves in a
position to interrogate them and mediate between them does not necessarily lead to the
relativistic view that, say, burning women as witches might in fact be o.k. in some
cultures or in some circumstances. Pragmatism provides a method of mediation, a method
of examining the consequences of all our beliefs, a method that has everything to do with
worrying about contradictions in our worldview. As such, it is not a method of
compromise, but a different approach in its own right.
The Pragmatists on Religion
I begin this section with Ralph Waldo Emerson because, as Cornel West puts it, in
so many ways the work of James, Peirce, and Dewey rests “on the shoulders of Emerson”
(Evasion 6). In a chapter entitled “Religion” from his book English Traits, Emerson
makes the following comparison: “It is with religion as with marriage. A youth marries in
haste; afterwards, when his mind is opened to the reason of the conduct of life, he is
asked what he thinks of the institution of marriage and of the right relations of the sexes.
‘I should have much to say,’ he might reply, ‘if the question were open, but I have a wife
and children, and all question is closed for me” (503). He reminds us that all too often we
resign ourselves early on to the way in which we assume things must be and in doing so
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completely ignore our real-world experiences which might, if examined, fundamentally
change our beliefs. With respect to the mountain of religious dogma that is so often
imparted to us from the moment we enter this world, Emerson sardonically observes that
it’s so much easier to more or less concede and “find some niche or crevice in this
mountain of stone which religious ages have quarried and carved, wherein to bestow
yourself, than attempt anything ridiculously and dangerously above your strength, like
removing it” (504). Finding such a strength is imperative, though, and we must, he
argues, look to our own time and our own lives to find it: “the stationariness of religion;
the assumption that the age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed…indicate with
sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It is the office of a true teacher to show
us that God is, not was” (87). If religion is to have any use, he argues, there should be no
such thing as a national or universal notion of God, faith, or church. I quote Emerson at
length here because he is so eloquent on the point: “Where dwells religion? Tell me first
where dwells electricity, or motion, or thought, or gesture. They do not dwell or stay at
all….” Like electricity, religion is “passing, glancing, gesticular; it is a traveler, a
newness, a surprise, a secret” (513).
From this perspective, it is impossible to confine religion to a single sphere. As
Ann Berthoff, Susanne Langer, and others would later argue that dividing the emotional
from the intellect is not only wrong but harmful, Emerson and the Pragmatists who
follow him argue that separating our faith from our logical understanding of the world is
equally misguided: “I look for the new teacher…[who] shall show that the Ought, that
[moral and religious] Duty, is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy”
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(Emerson 91). It’s interesting to note as well that Henry Ward Beecher, who has been
called “America’s most prominent nineteenth-century liberal preacher and […] perhaps
the most powerful preacher in American history, if not in the history of the Anglo-Saxon
people” (Chandler 19), was preaching more or less the same thing at exactly the same
time. Like the Pragmatists, an essential aspect of Beecher’s faith was his attempt to
harmonize spirituality with the “real world”; he worked to dispel the assumed conflict
between theological tenets and secular truths. As William McLoughlin tells us,
“Beecher’s great achievement was to amalgamate Romanticism, religion, and science—
the epistemology of Kant, the Gospel of Jesus, the teleology of Spencer” (4). He
preached “to the throbbing human heart, to reaffirm its faith in Christianity, and yet to do
so without undermining the equally profound faith of Americans in science, education,
and learning—in short, to harmonize religion and science not through metaphysical
speculation …but through appealing to emotional experience” (39). Beecher writes in a
letter to Theodore Tilton, “I discern, arising in studies in Natural Science, a surer
foothold for these [evangelical] views than they have ever had. Insofar as theology is
concerned, if I have one purpose or aim, it is to secure for the truths now developing in
the sphere of Natural Science a religious spirit and harmonization with all the cardinal
truths of religion” (McLoughlin Pre-preface). Referring to two classical gods of
philosophy, Beecher offers this following harmony: “It has been said that everybody is
either a Platonist or an Aristotelian—Plato standing for ideal philosophy and Aristotle for
the real and practical. Everybody tends, it is said, to follow one or the other. No; the
perfect man unites them both, and is at once Aristotelian and Platonist. His feet standing
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on solid fact, his head goes philosophizing, and his heart keeps the balance between
them” (John Howard 158).
Like Emerson’s, Beecher’s examples were often a bit gendered (a sign of the
times), but also like Emerson’s they not only illustrated his ongoing attempt to square
secular and spiritual truths, but they advocated an activity that worked to repel the
prevailing static nature of dogma. Emerson writes,
The sacredness which attaches to the act of creation, the act of thought, is
transferred to the record. The poet chanting is felt to be a divine man: henceforth
the chant is divine also. The writer was a just and wise spirit: henceforth it is
settled the book is perfect; as love of the hero corrupts into worship of his statue.
Instantly the book becomes noxious: the guide is a tyrant. (55)
Pushing this point, Emerson adds, “Books are for the scholar’s idle times. When he can
read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men’s transcripts of their
readings” (57): “The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul” (56). This focus
on activity, on the notion that real and useful knowledge generally comes from lived
experience (“Only so much do I know, as I have lived” (59)) prompts us to understand
that new experiences will inevitably challenge existing beliefs. Our beliefs, our habits,
our truths must constantly change as our experiences tell us something doesn’t work
anymore. On this note, Beecher suggests that too many people are alarmed “at the
inevitable changes in theology and government and the conditions of the people. They
want peace. Well, you can find it in the graveyard, and that is the only place. Among
living men you can find no peace. Growth means disturbance; peace in any such sense as
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that of no investigation, no change, means death” (Lectures 126). Just as Emerson did,
Beecher offered this advice over and over: “There must be, in any healthful society, a
process of absorption, or of reconstruction of its organizations…A society whose
institutions are unchanging is itself ungrowing. The living body alters. Only the dead
rest” (Life Thoughts 62). Taking the specific example of prayer, he instructs, “Do not
come to me and tell me you are fit to join the church because you love to pray morning
and night. Tell me what your praying has done for you; and then call your neighbors, and
let me hear what they think it has done for you” (Life Thoughts 121). The habit of
praying must do something in this world, must be useful here, for it to count as real, or as
true.
It’s difficult to say how much influence Beecher’s theology had on the work of
James, Pierce, and Dewey (Beecher has been rather maligned and marginalized by
history—unjustly, I believe, but that’s a topic for another time). Emerson’s influence,
however—which will hopefully become apparent in the following pages—is undeniable.
While there are certainly distinctions to be made between the way in which James,
Peirce, and Dewey approach the topic of faith, I think it’s fair to make the general claim
that the Pragmatic approach to faith I set out to describe below is rooted in Emerson’s
(and perhaps to some extent Beecher’s) understanding that religion should not be severed
from our other experiences in this world and that a healthy faith always requires inquiry
and action. In outlining what I have termed a Pragmatic approach to faith, I first look to
Peirce, then to James, and finally to Dewey.
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The Church Is What The Church Does
Charles Sanders Peirce is widely understood as the father of Pragmatism (a word
which has its roots in a Greek term meaning action). In 1878 his essay “How to Make our
Ideas Clear” proposed that in order to understand what something is, or what something
means, we need to understand what that something does. To put it crudely, Force is what
Force does, or Love is what Love does. As I’ve mentioned earlier, Peirce argued that our
beliefs lead to habits, or rules of action, and thus we need to constantly examine the
consequences of our beliefs (that is to say we need to constantly examine our habits, or
our rules of action) in order to interrogate the validity of those beliefs. He writes, for
example, that while “faith in the sense that one will adhere consistently to a given line of
conduct, is highly necessary in affairs…if it means that you are not going to be alert for
indications that the moment has come to change your tactics, I think it is ruinous in
practice” (Philosophy 187). After all is said and done, he concludes that “we come down
to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of
thought” (“Ideas” 292-93).
Peirce was a scientist, a mathematician, and a logician, and thus his focus on the
tangible and the practical makes sense, but his “original conceptions of pragmatism—and
later pragmaticism—are indebted to Emersonian sensibilities of philosophy as cultural
criticism with moral purpose” (West, Evasion 43). Both Emerson and Peirce saw
“science as continuous with religion—both shot through with moral purpose” (42). Peirce
had a number of problems with the prevailing romantic and positivistic movements of his
time, and he worked to dismantle their claims of “infallible certainty, and thus keep open
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the possibility of discovering a rational reconciliation of science with religious values as
expressions of human needs” (Charles 345). His attempt at this reconciliation, with its
emphasis on action and human experience in a social setting, propelled the Pragmatic
approach that inspired the likes of James, Dewey, Rorty, and West: “Peirce’s double
consciousness of experimental inquiry and common human sentiments and his dual
allegiance to scientific method and Christian faith serve as the soil upon which the seeds
of American Pragmatism sprout” (West, Evasion 49). Before I get much further, though,
it may be useful to set out a few definitions—namely how Peirce defines science and
religion. In “The Marriage of Religion and Science” he begins by asking “What is
science?” and he answers,
The Dictionary will say that it is systematized knowledge…Mere knowledge
[however], though it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science
we all habitually mean a living and growing body of truth…That which
constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it is a correct
method. But the method of science is itself a scientific result. It did not spring out
of the brain of a beginner: it was a historic attainment and a scientific
achievement. So that not even this method ought to be regarded as essential to the
beginnings of science. That which is essential, however, is the scientific spirit,
which is determined not to rest satisfied with existing opinions… (Charles 350)
In the following paragraph he asks “What is religion?” and suggests that
in each individual it is a sort of sentiment, or obscure perception, a deep
recognition of a something in the circumambient All which, if he strives to
express it, will clothe itself in forms more or less extravagant, more or less
accidental, but ever acknowledging the first and last…as well as a relation to that
Absolute of the individual’s self, as a relative being. (351)
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Like Emerson, one point of friction that Peirce spends a fair amount of time trying to
work out is the way in which science pushes ahead while religion—as we try to express
it, grapple with it, and place ourselves in relation to it—tends to look to the past. As
science grows and builds upon itself, religion has “seldom been seen so vitalized as to
become more and more perfect, even as judged from its own standpoint. Like a plucked
flower, its destiny is to wilt and fade” (351). What initially spawned religious sentiment
“loses gradually its pristine purity and strength, till some new creed treads it down. Thus
it happens quite naturally that those who are animated with the spirit of science are for
hurrying forward, while those who have the interests of religion at heart are apt to press
back” ( 351).
While arguing that both endeavors should be “animated by a progressive spirit”
(352), Peirce offers his theory of agapism as one way to bridge the gap. A perspective
intended as a response to Darwin’s proposal of evolution, agapism posits that what has
moved all of us forward is not simply the blind mechanics of natural selection, but the
blind mechanics of natural selection combined with chance and love. And of these three,
he argues, love is the primary force. Peirce admits that this proposal “will probably
shock my scientific brethren” (Philosophy 364), but he is adamant in arguing that
understanding who we are and how we came to be this way cannot be understood by
chance and science alone. For a scientist, he braves the waters of feeling: “if it were
possible to believe in agapism without believing it warmly, that fact would be an
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argument against the truth of the doctrine. At any rate, since the warmth of feeling exists,
it should on every account be candidly confessed” (364).
At the heart of what drives his argument here lies a rejection of the Cartesian
focus on the inner self and, in its place, an emphasis on our social web as having powered
our evolution. “Everybody can see,” he argues, “that the statement of St. John is the
formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love,
from—I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest
impulse” (362). There is a focus on being responsible to other people around you, and
this responsibility is alive and in the present, not indoctrinated in a truth from the past. To
this end, he tried to demystify
the scientific method into a human affair, into a set of distinct social practices by
which knowledge is produced. This role of pragmatism as cultural demystifying
activity (focused on the supreme modern authority, science) permits Peirce to
defend religion, not devalue or dismiss it. In fact, Peirce’s conception of scientific
method as a value-laden and normative social activity not only conjoins science
and ethics but also posits (and invokes) a religious telos. (West, Evasion 43-44)
In “Evolutionary Love,” Peirce writes, “As Darwin puts it on his title page, it is the
struggle for existence; and he should have added for his motto: every individual for
himself, and the Devil take the hindmost!” (364). He puts Darwin’s theory of evolution in
his own religious and layman’s terms:
Here, then is the issue. The Gospel of Christ says that progress comes from every
individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors. On the other
side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is that progress takes place by virtue
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of every individual’s striving for himself with all his might and trampling his
neighbor underfoot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be
called the Gospel of Greed. (364)
In arguing instead for a Gospel of Love based on social responsibility, Peirce
appeals to what he calls the “Sensible Heart” with the church playing an indispensable
role as social catalyst. Unlike Richard Rorty, but very much in accord with other
contemporary writers such as Jim Wallis and Stephen Carter, Peirce suggests that without
a very public, vibrant, national church, our evolution as civilized beings is all but
impossible. He pressed that “religion is a great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social
life which extends beyond one’s own circle of personal friends. That life is everything for
elevated, and humane, and democratic civilization” (West, Evasion 48). In his essay
“What is Christian Faith,” he advises that
Man’s highest developments are social; and religion, though it begins in a seminal
individual inspiration, only comes to full flower in a great church coextensive
with a civilization…Its ideal is that the whole world shall be united in the bond of
a common love of God accomplished by each man’s loving his neighbor. Without
a church, the religion of love can have but a rudimentary existence; and a narrow,
little exclusive church is almost worse than none. A great Catholic church is
wanted. (Charles 355)
He believed that the “raison d’etre of a church is to confer upon men a life broader than
their narrow personalities” (West, Evasion 48). He chastised, “who are you, anyway, who
are so zealous to keep the churches small and exclusive?” (Philosophy 357) and he
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argued that “if one renounces the church, in what other way can one as satisfactorily
exercise the faculty of fraternizing with all one’s neighbors?” (West, Evasion 48).
There are, I suspect, a few points one might take issue with regarding this
perspective. For instance, one could argue that there are many other satisfactory ways to
fraternize and connect with other members of society than through a church, and there are
certainly those who would take issue with his agapistic theory of evolution (Peirce’s own
friend Chauncey Wright, for example, who saw in Darwin’s theory no moral purpose
whatsoever). My main point, though, is that as a scientist Peirce worked hard to reconcile
the conflict between faith and science, and while some of us might disagree with a few of
his particular views on the role of religion (I, admittedly, am one of them), his attempt at
mediation can help us tremendously in grappling with this same conflict in a writing class
that is geared toward social consciousness. He has linked, for instance, one of the central
tenets of his Pragmatic method—examining the consequences of our beliefs so as to
interrogate those beliefs—with the teachings of Jesus. Commenting on this primary tenet,
he writes, “it has been said to be a skeptical and materialistic principal. But it is only an
application of the sole principal of logic which was recommended by Jesus; ‘Ye may
know them by their fruits’” (West, Evasion 50). Peirce went on to stress the social
implications of this connection by reminding us that the fruit is “collective, it is the
achievement of the whole people” (50). He was adamant that our advance through time
has been possible only through collective action and that no single individual has ever
accomplished anything alone, including Darwin: “I doubt,” he suggests, “if any of the
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great discoveries ought, properly, to be considered as altogether individual achievements”
(Philosophy 374). Likewise,
religion cannot reside in its totality in a single individual. Like every species of
reality, it is essentially a social, a public affair. It is the idea of a whole church,
welding all its members together in one organic, systemic perception of the Glory
of the Highest—an idea having a growth from generation to generation…
(Charles 351)
On the surface this may appear as a departure from Emerson’s focus on the
individual, but Emerson too saw the individual as deeply connected with community. As
he writes, for example, in his essay “History,” there is really only “one mind common to
all men” in that we all share the same consciousness (otherwise we couldn’t even
communicate). Only our particular place in history makes us unique—there is no pure
originality; we quote everything; we are all interconnected. Or as he says at the outset of
this essay, “I am the owner of Caesar’s hand/and Plato’s brain/of Lord Christ’s heart/and
Shakespeare’s strain” (115). Peirce’s amalgamation of science and religion was very
much based on such an understanding of the individual as a continuum of, and in the
context of, the larger community.
So too did Peirce draw on Emerson’s principals concerning personal experience.
As Emerson told us to stop looking back across the sea at what others have written but
instead look to our own everyday experiences in order to form our beliefs—to “explore
and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low,” and to understand that “life [not the library] is
our dictionary”—Peirce advises as well that “the scientific spirit requires a man to be at
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all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against
them. The desire to learn forbids him to be perfectly cocksure that he knows already.
Besides, positive science can only rest on experience; and experience can never result in
absolute certainty, exactitude, necessity, or universality” (West, Evasion 46). And while
Peirce believed in God, quoted scripture, and, as noted above, held the church in very
high esteem, he also held that the “religious spirit” must undergo a similar test:
It is easy to chop logic about matters of which you have no experience whatever.
Men color blind have more than once learnedly discussed the laws of color-
sensation, and have made interesting deductions from those laws. But when it
comes to positive knowledge, such knowledge as a lawyer has of the practice of
the courts, that can only rest on long experience, direct or indirect. So, a man may
be an accomplished theologian without ever having felt the stirring of the spirit;
but he cannot answer the simple question at the head of this article [“What Is
Christian Faith?”] except out of his own religious experience. (Charles 353)
Peirce was optimistic that focusing on our experiences would ultimately lead us to a
fuller understanding of God (more so, in fact, than either James or Dewey, who felt that
our experiences could lead us in a number of possible directions); he felt it was
“sufficient to go out into the air and open one’s eyes to see that the world is not governed
altogether by mechanism” (348). But he also believed that for both faith and science, one
can only grow “by experience continually pouring upon him ideas he has not yet
acquired” (West, Evasion 50). And like Emerson, these ideas were not to come from
what others have said: “I appeal,” Peirce writes, “to the typical Christian to answer out of
the abundance of his spirit, without dictation from priests” (Charles 354). For, as he asks
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rhetorically in his essay “The Concept of God,” “where would such an idea, say as that of
God, come from, if not from direct experience?” (Philosophy 377).
In relying upon our experience as a guide for both our scientific and religious
endeavors, however, Peirce cautions us to avoid precision. He suggests that “‘God’ is a
vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than almost any, is vague (375, his
italics). Peirce believed in the reality of God, but he felt that one of the greatest errors we
make concerning this reality was to render him too precise. “No concept, not even those
of mathematics, is absolutely precise; and some of the most important for everyday use
are extremely vague” (376). As Kenneth Burke later called “rotten with perfection” (a
term which describes our innate desire to establish perfect definitions and then cling to
them indefinitely), Peirce felt that our trouble with faith was our inability to rely on ill-
defined instinct and hence our wrong-headed pursuit of absolute truths. “Our instinctive
beliefs involving such concepts,” he argues, “are far more trustworthy than the best
established results of science, if these be precisely understood. Men who are given to
defining too much inevitably run themselves into confusion” (376). Like Langer and
Berthoff and Rosenblatt and Dewey who would later argue that our emotions are as
important as our intellect in constituting our minds and our understanding of the world
around us, Peirce argues that in fact instinct and emotion far outweigh reason and logic.
Regarding the question of God, he posits,
the only guide to the answer to this question lies in the power of the passion of
love which more or less overmasters every agnostic scientist and everybody who
seriously and deeply considers the universe. But whatever there may be in
argument in all this is as nothing, the merest nothing, in comparison to its force as
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an appeal to one’s own instinct, which is to argument what substance is to
shadow, what bed-rock is to the built foundations of a cathedral. (377)
When it comes to both God and science, vague instinct—like Ann Berthoff’s support for
chaos and I. A. Richards’ support for ambiguities—should more often than not be our
guide. For example, he argues that “we all think that there is an element of order in the
universe. Could any laboratory experiments render that proposition more certain than
instinct or common sense leaves it?” Of course not, he suggests, and “when anybody
undertakes to say precisely what that order consists in, he will quickly find he outruns all
logical warrant” (376).
In conjunction with this preference for vague intuition as opposed to precise
definition comes a sense of hybridity that Peirce says must be understood and
acknowledged as well. To put it in terms that might apply to the socially motivated
composition class, we need not view atheists and theists or Democrats and Republicans
as polar opposites that must be either attacked or ignored by the other. “The love that
God is,” Peirce argues, “is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan
would be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage
of it” (362). This hybrid approach to our understanding of the world, or the notion that
there would be no secular approach without a religious approach and vice-versa, can help
to provide a starting point for dialogue in the writing class. It can help provide a fresh and
useful perspective of what is too commonly understood as “the other” by perhaps
suggesting that we view science as an imperfect stage of faith and faith as an imperfect
stage of science. And for Peirce, this all goes back to social responsibility, “for self-love
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is no love” (362). Separate camps usually lead to what he has termed as the Gospel of
Greed: he reminds us that “the movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse
projecting creations into independency and drawing them into harmony,” and that “Love
is not directed to abstractions but to persons,” to our neighbors, to those we share this
planet with right now (362). 
Peirce also offers what he calls a Neglected Argument concerning the question of
God, an argument closely connected to that of avoiding precision and embracing the
vague. He promotes the notion of Pure Play, which “involves no purpose save that of
casting aside all serious purpose” and which “has no rules, except this very law of liberty.
It bloweth where it listeth” (Charles 360). Tapping into the value of what might be called
the pleasure of instinct, he writes that it is
‘Musement’ on the whole—that I particularly recommend, because it will in time
flower into the N.A. [the Neglected Argument]. One who sits down with the
purpose of becoming convinced of the truth of religion…can never attain the
entirety even of a physicist’s belief in electrons….But let religious meditation be
allowed to grow up spontaneously out of Pure Play without any breach of
continuity, and the Muser will retain the perfect candor proper to Musement.
(360)
With this argument, too, he is careful to continue warning us against precision, for “if
one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the
Play will be converted into scientific study,” and that will lead us awry (361). And
despite his great respect for the church, Peirce continuously leads us away from the
constraints of dogma—he repeats, “Adhere to the one ordinance of Play, the law of
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liberty” (361). For Peirce, liberty in this context stands in stark contrast to dogma. To find
God, he suggests, it’s necessary to set aside the direction we receive from priests, parents,
or books, and instead “Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought,
and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is
about or within you, and open conversation with yourself” (362).
Peirce felt that if his advice was taken, “in the Pure Play of Musement the idea of
God’s reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy, which the Muser
will develop in various ways” (365). He believed in the reality of God, but underscored
again and again that the hypothesis of God must be understood “as vague…and
inevitably subject to the law of growth” (365). Growth is not only acquiring new
experiences to alter and build upon our old beliefs, but the active pursuit of those new
experiences as well. Faith, science, and growth are as synonyms in the sense of active
forward movement. In remembering an old acquaintance, Peirce writes,
For example, I knew a scientific man who devoted his last years to reading
theology in hopes of coming to a belief in God, but who never could in the least
degree come to a consciousness of having the least belief of the sort, yet
passionately pursued that very mistaken means of attaining his heart’s supreme
desire. He, according to me, was a shining example of Faith in God. For to
believe in reasoning about phenomena is to believe that they are governed by
reason, that is, by God. (Charles 400)
It doesn’t matter that this man never found what he set out to find (and it might be added
that according to Peirce, had he engaged in Musement or Pure Play, he would have been
more successful). What matters is his passionate, reasonable pursuit. As with science, it’s
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the pursuit that Peirce calls faith, not the end achievement, and he goes as far as to call
reason and God the same thing when wrapped up in pursuit—that is, when wrapped up in
the effort of making our beliefs conform with one another:
Every true man of science, i.e., every man belonging to a social group all the
members of which sacrifice all the ordinary motives of life to their desire to make
their beliefs concerning one subject conform to verified judgments of perception,
together with sound reasoning, and who therefore really believes the universe to
be governed by reason, or in other words by God—but who does not explicitly
recognize that he believes in God—has faith in God, according to my use of the
term Faith. (400)
During this inquiry, we will inevitably run into propositions that don’t seem very
likely. At these moments it’s critical to keep an open mind, “to dismiss doubts on the
matter from consideration.” Dismissing doubts from the process of inquiry, however,
does not mean closing off possibilities; it simply means giving the proposition at hand
every opportunity. “There is a vast difference,” Peirce notes, “between that and any
holding of the proposition for certain. To hold a proposition for certain is to puff oneself
up with the vanity of perfect knowledge. It leaves no room for Faith” (400). To pursue
means to allow for the possibility of a proposition without any reservation, a perspective
that allows for greater possibilities, not fewer (a perspective, in fact, much like Peter
Elbow’s more contemporary “Doubting and Believing” game). Anticipating criticism,
Peirce offers the following example on this point: “But you may ask, don’t you admit
there are any delusions? Yes: I may think a thing is black, and on close examination it
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may turn out to be bottle-green. But I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such
thing to be seen as black” (Philosophy 378).
As we will also see with James and Dewey, the pragmatic method pushes us to
imagine a greater number of possibilities, and the same standard applies for both reason
and faith. Indeed, as noted above, they are often understood as the same thing. For as
Peirce says elsewhere, “logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it
terminates in action, must begin in emotion” (West, Evasion 53). And in this struggle, in
this pursuit, we must return to the underlying maxim of Peirce’s pragmatism: to consider
“what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of
our conception to have” (49). Its practical effects define the object. In other words, Love
is what Love does. Force is what Force does. And Religion is what Religion does.
You Can’t Know Till You Get There
Of the three primary Pragmatists I discuss in this Chapter, William James has the
most to say about religion. In addition to his substantial Varieties of Religious Experience
and influential essays such as “Will to Believe,” the topic of religion appears throughout
the corpus of his work. In Pragmatism, for example, where he outlines and develops the
method Peirce established, God and religion appear on nearly every other page. He notes,
in fact, that “the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism…lay entirely unnoticed
by anyone for twenty years, until I, in an address before professor Howison’s
philosophical union at the University of California, brought it forward again and made a
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special application of it to religion” (24). James was constantly grappling with the way in
which religious faith occupied our lives. As Bennett Ramsey notes,
I see James as absorbed, throughout most of his work, with the investigation and
consideration of religious problems. More to the point, I see him attempting to
broaden the definition of religion beyond the confines of theistic and
supernaturalistic frameworks toward immanentist, almost naturalistic meaning.
Above all, I see James as advocating a religious way of life, a way of being based
not on control, but on respect for and responsibility to the immanent ties and
powers that bind the self. (3)
In the following pages I hope to show that what James has to say about religion can prove
invaluable to us in the contemporary composition class, and what he has to say to
teachers in particular is also well worth a review. I begin with the latter, as it directly
relates to the former.
In Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals,
James tries to free the profession of teaching from the all-too stringent and confining
regulations that defined it for so long. There is no one formula for teachers, he argues;
“Psychology is a science—teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out
of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application, by use of its
originality” (23-24). As Louise Rosenblatt would argue years later, meaning and
understanding are made in that third space, that “intermediary inventive” space between
text and reader, between teacher and pupil. “The science of logic never made a man
reason rightly,” James says, “and the science of ethics (if there be such a thing) never
made a man behave rightly” (24). Thus, as teachers we need to put our focus on those
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“intermediate inventive minds” which, as we know, do not come uniformly packaged. As
Paul Woodring notes, James wanted no “straightjacket for the teacher” (15), and his
“view of teaching, and of the role of the teacher, offers a possible basis for the
reconciliation of the disastrous conflict between academic scholars and professional
educators that has long been a disgrace to our higher institutions” (17).
In the Preface of Talks to Teachers, James begins on the first page by advising
teachers to approach their students as whole people. “My main desire,” he states, “has
been to make [teachers] conceive, and, if possible, reproduce sympathetically in their
imagination, the mental life of their pupil as the sort of active unity which he himself
feels it to be. He doesn’t chop himself up into distinct processes and compartments” (18).
From this foundation, James describes the human being as essentially an organism
constantly reacting to a barrage of impressions. Education, he suggests, “is little more
than a mass of possibilities of reaction, acquired at home, at school, or in the training of
affairs. The teacher’s task is that of supervising the acquiring process” (42, his emphasis).
And particularly useful to our discussion of faith in the writing class is, I believe, his
notion that “Every acquired reaction is, as a rule, either a complication grafted on a
native reaction, or a substitute for a native reaction” (42, his emphasis). James develops
this notion as well in Pragmatism with a cooking metaphor, arguing that all of our new
truths must be gradually “stewed down with the sauce of the old” (75). What is
paramount, however, on the teacher’s part is that in attempting to graft new knowledge
onto the old, or stew fresh complications down into well-worn native reactions, the
teacher must attempt to have a grasp of those native reactions that have long been in
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place. “The teacher’s art,” he posits, “consists in bringing about the substitution or
complication, and success in the art presupposes a sympathetic acquaintance with the
reactive tendencies natively there” (42). While it’s impossible, of course, to be
acquainted with all the native reactive tendencies of all of our students, many of us would
do well—including myself—to foster a more “sympathetic acquaintance” with the mass
of religious reactions we know to be already there when we attempt to disturb it by
“grafting” and “substituting.”
Central to this process that James describes is the concept of habit. As Peirce
placed a great deal of importance on examining the consequences of our habits so as to
continuously adjust our beliefs, so too does James emphasize our need to understand
“The Laws of Habit,” as he titles Chapter Eight in Talks To Teachers. “It is very
important,” he begins, “that teachers should realize the importance of habit” in that “all
our life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits—practical, emotional, and
intellectual—systematically organized for our weal or woe…” (57). When our nervous
systems are first asked to do something, James explains, it’s hard-going, but the more
often the same thing is attempted, the easier it is accomplished, until we can, as they say,
do it in our sleep. And over time, our
nervous systems have…grown to the way in which they have been exercised, just as a
sheet of paper or a coat, once creased or folded, tends to fall forever afterward into the
same identical folds. Habit is thus a second nature…Ninety-nine hundredths or, possibly,
nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of our activity is purely automatic and
habitual, from our rising in the morning to our lying down each night. (57)
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Our responses to the world, then, become “so fixed by repetition as almost to be classed
as reflex actions,” and I don’t need to rely on William James to tell us that old habits are
hard to break. So hard, in fact, that James advises, “we must make automatic and
habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can” (58).
With respect to these engrained habits that control nearly everything we do, James
felt that religious faith had the possibility of becoming incredibly useful. Like Peirce, he
placed a higher premium on what we feel than on what we reason: “Our judgments
concerning the worth of things, big or little, depend on the feelings the things arouse in
us. Where we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the idea we frame of it, this
is only because the idea is itself associated already with a feeling” (149). In his
concluding Chapter in Talks To Teachers, “What Makes a Life Significant,” James
quotes Tolstoy: “The more we live by our intellect, the less we understand the meaning of
life” (179). Faith is important, in other words; to dismiss it, according to James, is a great
mistake, whether we’re in a classroom or in a meadow. As teachers, then, our first step
should be to attempt a “sympathetic acquaintance” with the native, habitual, religious
reactions already in place for most of our students. For wile attempting to graft or
substitute new habits onto or in place of these old ones is the calling of education, it
doesn’t get much more difficult than poking around in the pot of religious faith.
The pragmatic approach crafted by James can help us with this venture. His
method takes a middle ground, so to speak, allowing for greater possibilities in our search
for useful truths and useful actions. It is a method based on contingency, plurality, and
responsibility to other people; it is a method where every claim to truth is held
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accountable to the other things we also hold to be true. And while James strenuously
argues that we must meet each other half way and allow for the possibility of conflicting
perspectives, he also stresses throughout his work a basic right to believe in religious
faith. James, like Peirce, was not a disingenuous secular scientist simply trying to appease
“the believers” in a Godless academic setting. For example, he opens his essay “The Will
to Believe” by stating in very plain terms that this essay is a “justification of faith, a
defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact
that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced” (88). Part of the genius of
his method is that it appeals to “both sides” (and there is no getting around the fact that
we are deeply polarized in the United States right now—there are opposing sides and
religious faith rests at the heart of the flux). He is able to catch the ear of believers and
non-believers alike.
James acknowledges that defining religious faith is, almost by definition, an
impossible task because it has been understood in so many different ways. “In discussing
the religious question,” then, he urges that “we must make it very generic and broad”
(“Will” 105). As such, he describes the two primary qualities of religious faith. First, he
suggests, religion argues “that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping
things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final
word.” Second, religion argues “that we are better off even now if we believe her first
affirmation to be true” (105, my italics). In addition to this definition, James says that
choosing between believing and not believing (and it is an active choice) is a momentous,
forced option. He defines “option” as the decision one makes between two hypotheses,
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and he calls this option momentous for obvious reasons—the truth about our being
(where we’re from and where we’re going) is not a trivial matter. The option is also
forced because we absolutely have to choose; there is no sidestepping the issue. He
explains, “if I say to you: ‘choose between going out with your umbrella or without it,’ I
do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not
going out at all….But if I say, ‘either accept this truth or go without it,’ I put on you a
forced option, for there is no standing place outside the alternative” (89). Choosing not to
believe in religious faith, James argues, is as active a choice as choosing to believe. The
nonbeliever “is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the
field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious
hypothesis against the field” (106). Finally, and perhaps the most important ingredient
here, is the distinction he makes between a living option and a dead option.
A living option is one where both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: ‘Be a
theosophist or be a Mohammedan,’ it is probably a dead option, because for you
neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say, ‘Be an agnostic or be a
Christian,’ it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal,
however small, to your belief. (89)
You don’t need to accept a particular hypothesis as true for it to be a living choice from
which to choose your option. You just need to allow for the slightest possibility that it
might be true. And there’s the rub, practically speaking: getting each side to acknowledge
the other hypothesis—the one it did not choose as its option—as a live hypothesis so that
real dialogue is feasible. And whether or not a hypothesis is seen as live or dead depends
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not on some inherent trait in the hypothesis itself, but rather on the experiences of the
individual. The “deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but
relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act” (89). One
is not willing to act, of course, if one does not see any possibility in the first place.
Possibility, then, is a key component to James’ Pragmatic approach to religious
faith. He rejects the dogmatic absolutist as well as the agnostic and the atheist: “I
cannot,” he argues, “willfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot
do so for this plain reason, that a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me
from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would
be an irrational rule” (107). Religious faith, in other words, should not be defined as a
belief “that you know ain’t true,” nor should it be understood as an ultimate truth above
and beyond all our other truths. It should be understood as a possible hypothesis, worthy
of consideration yet subject to the same critique as any of our other contending beliefs.
So while “the idea of Him seems even to exert a positively paralyzing effect on the mind”
of a non-believer, this effect does not render the hypothesis dead. And, for the believer, it
is necessary to understand that claims to divine experiences are “like all other human
experiences” in that “they too certainly share in the general liability to illusion and
mistake” (85). The words “maybe” and “some” need to be entertained more by everyone,
he says, as all too often “the only categories universally consistent and therefore pertinent
to reality are ‘all’ and ‘none’” (Pragmatism 122). Our daily experiences necessarily
guarantee “that the next turn in events can at any given moment genuinely be ambiguous,
i.e., possibly this, but also possibly that” (130). Our daily experiences also allow us to
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determine if there are any existing conditions for something or other to be true. And when
“the conditions are entirely complete, it ceases to be a possibility, and turns into an actual
fact” (124-25). Taking a tenet of religious faith as an example, James writes,
Let us apply this notion to the salvation of the world. What does it pragmatically
mean to say that this is possible? It means that some of the conditions of the
world’s deliverance do actually exist. The more of them there are existent, the
fewer preventing conditions you can find, the better-grounded is the salvation’s
possibility, the more probable does the fact of the deliverance become. (125)
How do we know that some of these conditions actually exist? And how will we know
when all the necessary conditions become complete? We don’t. Imbedded in this focus
on possibility is the idea that we might actually know the truth about something, but that
is much different from knowing for sure that we know the truth about something. “To
know is one thing, and to know for certain that we know is another” (“Will” 96). This
doctrine cautions both sides. It warns the dogmatic absolutist that while he may be right,
there is yet no (or at least not enough) evidence to confirm the fact. It also warns the
atheistic absolutist that while she too may be right, the argument that there is yet no
evidence to confirm the existence of God does not altogether bar his existence. For as
James says, “if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when truth is
in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of
waiting for the bell” (108). Regarding our truths, there will never be a final ringing of the
bell. They will always change and grow, building upon each other as we collaboratively
move into the future.
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Where does this leave us, then? With a mass of infinite possibilities? The short
answer is no. Our allowance for “the possible” is grounded in the idea that we must
square all of our possible truths with all of our other possible truths until they work
themselves out. “In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the
rest of our truths” (Pragmatism 37). For while James counts himself as a believer in
religious faith and grants such faith greater importance than logic or reason, he is clear in
asserting that “My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must run the
gauntlet of all my other beliefs. Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday.
Nevertheless, as I conceive it…it clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits I hate
to give up on its account” (37). Such is his view of the Absolute, but elsewhere he goes
on to add
That the Absolute has nothing but its superhumanness in common with the
theistic God. On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual
difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the
problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily
with all the other working truths. (131)
The trick is to find a way to get religious faith to work along with our other lived
experiences rather than in place of our other lived experiences. And for a truth to
successfully run the gauntlet of all our other truths, it must prove itself useful to our lives.
If it fails this test, other truths will render it a dead hypothesis.
Usefulness, then, is another key component to the pragmatic method, and
religious faith is not exempt from having to be useful to us, here and now. In this regard,
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we can go back to the central pragmatic question as James frames it: What difference
would it make to us if this notion rather than that notion were true? Do the consequences
of this belief help us get along better in the world than the consequences of that belief?
These questions lead us not to the impetus of a possible belief, but rather to the end
result. It is not, as James puts it, “where it comes from, but what it leads to”; for a
pragmatist, it makes no difference “from what quarter an hypothesis may come to him: he
may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered or accident
suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means
by its being true” (99). As our possible truths spar with one another for supremacy,
“which may be treated as the more true depends altogether on the human use of it” (111).
For “they have, indeed, no meaning and no reality if they have no use” (118).
And the human use of it is understood in social, communal terms. At the outset of
Principles of Psychology, James’ early and perhaps most influential work, he casts his
portrait of the self in individual terms for the purposes of introducing his topic. By the
end of the book, however, and for the remainder of his career, the individual self is
understood—must be understood—in a social context. As Bennett Ramsey notes, in the
final section of the Principles James “added a background image to the primary
processes; he replaced the self not just back into its nascent state but into a social world.
Or rather, he replaced the self back into a socially unstable world, a world without
boundaries…” (48). James was well aware that to conceive of the self in isolation “was
an abstraction.” From here on the self would be set “in the world where James’ readers
lived, where all sorts of selves were at work…” (48).
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By the time James delivered his lectures which comprised The Varieties of
Religious Experience, religious experience was not at all conceived, developed, and
named from within an individual, but rather from without. Much in keeping with Lev
Vygotsky’s work a few years later, James proposed that unlike the Platonic description,
we do not first look inward for meaning—we do not first look inward to invent—and
then project out to the world; we look outward first, and develop our individual meanings
and knowledge from our surroundings. And our conceptions of religious faith are no
different: “religious love is only man’s natural emotion of love directed to a religious
object; religious fear is only the ordinary fear of commerce, so to speak, the common
quaking of the human breast” in response to and in relation to its environment (Varieties
36). As Vygotsky suggests in Thought and Language that “the word is a thing in our
consciousness... that is absolutely impossible for one person, but that becomes a reality
for two” (256), so too does James suggest that a personal, individual relationship with
God, once articulated, becomes crudely defined by dominate, pre-existing, public
descriptions. And as “Religion was now a program of work; it was not a path of
detachment and privacy but a route of radical and public commitment” (Ramsey 137),
our religious responsibility became a responsibility to other people rather than to an
ultimate, personal, abstract truth. We had a societal duty to constantly reexamine the
consequences of religious faith. Thus, in Varieties, he introduces his topic by addressing
those believers who simply accept, without active reflection, what they have been told:
I speak not now of your ordinary religious believer, who follows the conventional
observances of his country, whether it be Buddhist, Christian, or Mohammedan.
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His religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition,
determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit. It would profit us
little to study this second-hand religious life. We must make search rather for the
original experiences which were the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested
feeling and imitated conduct. These experiences we can only find in individuals
for whom religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather. (19)
Experience and imitation, James reminds us, are not the same thing. While the
latter is often misunderstood as the former, we must be careful to draw the distinction
because our experiences underlie all of our talk about squaring up truths and allowing for
possibilities. In referring to the work of John Dewey and others, James emphasizes “that
ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just insofar as they
help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience” (Pragmatism
28). We have a natural tendency to want to find and hold on to certain absolutes that give
us some sense of comfort and some sense of a grip, but as he states in “Will to Believe,”
an essay that explicitly defends our right to believe in religious faith, we need to treat this
tendency “as a weakness of our nature from which we must free ourselves….” He adds in
the following paragraph,
Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but
where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore,
myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I
live, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and
thinking over our experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true; but
to hold any one of them—I absolutely do not care which—as if it never could be
reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude.
(“Will” 97)
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As we “go on experiencing and thinking over” our own experiences to better
understand our lives, we must also beware of partitioning off these experiences into
separate compartments like “secular” and “religious.” Although they may not appear to,
all of our experiences function together; “the continuities and the discontinuities are
absolutely coordinate matters of immediate feeling,” all of which “compenetrate
harmoniously” (109). It’s easier to place our experiences in separate corners of separate
rooms, often according to some invented hierarchy, because in doing so we’re closer to
that absolute grip. This is not an honest practice, however, and it allows for little critique.
An honest view of our religious experience, for example, with all its “continuities and
discontinuities” taken together, forces us to see it as having caused immeasurable
amounts of death and suffering and as having also caused immeasurable amounts of love
and kindness. In this regard, James draws in Varieties the distinction between the
religiously healthy-minded and the sick soul. The name of the former is purposely
misleading to imply a naïve, oblivious optimism which is based on avoidance and which
doesn’t offer us much we can use. It was the sick-souled individual, for whom religion
was an “acute fever” rather than a “dull habit,” whose religious experiences were worth
examining because they included the whole of experience. The sick-soul is more acutely
aware of the circumstances that surround us. A touch of the morbid, in fact, is a necessary
element rather than something to be shunned. The religiously healthy-minded, James
argues, effectively minimize or ignore completely those experiences they find
distasteful—a practice that is encouraged by the dominate religion in the United States:
“The Catholic practice of confession and absolution,” he writes, is “little more than a
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systematic method of keeping healthy-mindedness on top” and of continuously allowing
one to start a “clean page with no old debts inscribed. Any Catholic will tell us how clean
and fresh and free he feels after the purging operation” (Varieties 120). As the limitations
of this approach tend to do us more harm than good in that they close off so many of our
experiences, James advises,
Let us then resolutely turn our backs on…their sky-blue optimistic gospel; let us
not simply cry out, in spite of all appearances, ‘Hurrah for the Universe!—God’s
in His heaven, all’s right with the world.’ Let us see rather whether pity, pain, and
fear, and the sentiment of human helplessness may not open a profounder view
and put into our hands a more complicated key to the meaning of the situation.
(126)
To find these sick-souled experiences of pity, pain, and helplessness, we need
look no further than to the daily experiences that constantly occur right before our eyes.
Like Emerson, who tells us that the book, if not used only as a supplement to experience,
“becomes noxious” and the guide “a tyrant,” James writes that any absolute, unwavering
doctrine is “but the old story, of a useful practice first becoming a method, then a habit,
and finally a tyranny that defeats the end it was used for” (Pluralistic 99). Also like
Emerson, who advises us to explore “the familiar, the common and the low,” James tells
us at the very outset of Varieties that what “we shall find most instructive need not then
be sought for in the haunts of special erudition—they lie along the beaten highway” (3).
“Pragmatism,” he writes elsewhere, “is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or
the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count
mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives
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in the very dirt of private fact—if that should seem a likely place to find Him”
(Pragmatism 38). James drew a fair amount of criticism, in fact, for practicing what he
preached here. In Principles, as in most of his other work, he relied a great deal on
simple, unsubstantiated testimony from lay people, drawing his conclusions more often
than not from their observations as “nonprofessionals.” Many, including C.S. Peirce, felt
that conclusions based on such “data” were suspect at best. Others, however, appreciated
his departure from the generally accepted scientific method. John Dewey comments, for
example, that James’ approach offers invaluable insight as it allows him to explore
“genuine events, events that most persons are too conventional or too literal to notice at
all” (Ramsey 35).
Included within the purview of these common experiences were hallucinations
and abstractions. Indeed, abstractions provided the basis of our minds: “we turn towards
them and from them, we seek them, hold them, hate them, bless them, just as if they were
so many concrete things” (Ramsey 90). Hallucinatory experiences fell within this
category, of course, and it is in these, James argues, where our religious inclinations find
their impetus. In short, the hallucinatory and the abstract count as much, if not more, than
the tangible and the concrete. “It is as if,” James notes,
there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective
presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there,’ more deep and
more general than any of the special and particular ‘senses’ by which the current
psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. (90)
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We had a right not only to believe in “something other” than what was tangibly before
our eyes, but a duty to count it among all our experiences in sorting out our truths. In this
sense it was to be included among our other experiences; it was not, however, a
replacement. Nor was religious experience “miraculous.” It worked in conjunction with
the rest of our lives to help broaden our understanding of ourselves and the world around
us.
The central focus on experience in James’ approach mandates that it is impossible
to hold anything for certain beforehand. You must wade through experience: “You
cannot enter the phenomenal world with the notion of it in your grasp, and name
beforehand any detail which you are likely to meet there” (123). This, in turn, brings us
back to the notion of possibility and contingency. Johan Huizinga writes, “The endeavor
to democratize the idea of God goes hand in hand with pragmatism, and both arise out of
the spirit of ‘This, Here, Soon.’” (West, Evasion 69). And as Peirce suggested that our
religious attitude should start pointing to the future rather than the past, James saw
everything as “a product of contingency and time” (Ramsey 12). We find ourselves,
then, with a pluralistic view of the world, a view which allows “that there may be one
sovereign purpose, system, kind, and story,” but that “it is rash to affirm this
dogmatically without better evidence than we possess at present” (Pragmatism 65 his
italics). Hence, the pragmatic method,
pending the final empirical ascertainment of just what the balance of union and
disunion among things may be, must obviously arrange herself along the
pluralistic side. Some day, she admits, even total union, with one knower, one
origin, and a universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be
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the most acceptable of all hypotheses. Meanwhile the opposite hypothesis, of a
world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always to remain so, must be
sincerely entertained. The latter hypothesis is pluralism’s doctrine. (72)
Enmeshed in this pluralistic view is the notion that pragmatism, as I cited in the
introduction, serves as “a happy harmonizer of empiricists ways of thinking with the
more religious demands of human beings” (Pragmatism 33). At the very outset of
Pragmatism, James compares two opposite types of “mental make-ups,” the Tender-
Minded (which he describes in part as Idealistic, Optimistic, Religious, Free-willist,
Monistic, Dogmatical) and the Tough-Minded (which he describes in part as
Materialistic, Pessimistic, Irreligious, Fatalistic, Pluralistic, Skeptical) (“Will” 9). One
can certainly quibble with the names he gives to each group and with their determining
characteristics, but the point is that a bridge needs to be gapped between two vastly
different and dominant perspectives on our place in the world. He goes on to add that
both sides “have a low opinion of each other,” and that “each type believes the other to be
inferior to itself” (9). In response, then, pragmatism tries to play the role of mediator so
that we can uncover as many useful habits as possible. In this role, she “‘unstiffens’ our
theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatsoever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid
cannons as what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any
hypothesis” (Pragmatism 38).
The polar opposites James described one hundred years ago—and the need to
bridge them—haven’t changed much. His pragmatism carved out a path down the
middle, so to speak, between the romantic, self-assertive doctrine of worship and the
86
disheartening, vacant view of the positivists, infusing the vision of the latter with some
vitality and purpose and the vision of the former with a grounding of sorts in the real
world of experience. Likewise, while James has repeatedly suggested that the vague and
the abstract are eminently important in constructing our knowledge, and that our
“intellectual” ideas are in fact founded first upon our feelings about a thing, he has not
discounted the importance of intelligence and factual common sense. “We are thinking
beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions”
(Varieties 374). Mind and emotion must be understood together; partitioning them off is a
mistake. It was this type of middle ground, this sense of intermingling, that James tried
to forge with respect to religion. “If you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and
radical sense,” he writes in his concluding paragraph of Pragmatism,
but mixed as most of us are, it may seem to you that the type of pluralistic and
moralistic religion that I have offered is as good a religious synthesis as you are
likely to find. Between the two extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and
transcendental absolutism on the other, you may find that what I take the liberty
of calling the pragmatistic or melioristic type of theism is exactly what you
require (132). 
 
Given what James has previously told us about habit, however, slipping in to this
centrist, pragmatic understanding of theism is a bit more difficult than just reading a book
or flipping a switch. The preliminary understanding that the pragmatic approach “is a
method only” and that “it does not stand for any special results” (25) strikes an uneasy
chord before one even gets started. Guaranteed results are, after all, what most of us are
in the habit of striving for. Relatedly, the method asks us to give up a certain amount of
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control. The pluralistic view of multiple possibilities did away with comfortable and
concrete foundations; to really give yourself over to the idea that an experience tomorrow
or in twenty years might change your entire world view takes a great amount of courage.
Part of undergoing this transition was to understand that being wrong was not only
inevitable, but also not the devastating disaster we make it out to be. “Our errors are
surely not such awfully solemn things,” he suggests. “In a world where we are so certain
to incur them, in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier
than…excessive nervousness on their behalf” (“Will” 100). A move in this direction,
however, is also necessarily humbling:
we are so subject to the philosophic tradition which treats logos or discursive
thought generally as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall back on raw unverbalized
life as more of a revealer…comes very hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of
mind and becoming as foolish little children in the eyes of reason” (Ramsey 124).
Ultimately, making this transition takes a great act of will. Action, in fact, is
absolutely required: “As long as talk continues talking, intellectualism remains in
undisturbed possession of the field. The return to life can’t come about by talking. It is an
act” (124). In this sense, though, relinquishing one form of control allows for another; the
first is based on a comfortable, passive reliance, where the second is based on an
uncomfortable, vigorous search. In discussing stream of thought with respect to the self
and the make-up of personal identity, James suggests that the choice of passive reliance
leads to a synthesis of thinking which is “simply taken ready-made and clapped on to [the
self] as expressions of her nature taken after the fact.” The choice of vigorous search, on
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the other hand, leads to a self that can be “called active; might select; was responsible,
and permanent in her way” (47). And on the subject of religion, James argues in “Will to
Believe” that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon action,” for “if the action
required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated
by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity” (108). And in this
respect, James posits that religious action must be given a chance, otherwise we will
never know its real value.
Ideally speaking, James would have liked everyone “to act,” to make an active
transition into an uncertain pluralistic view of the world, particularly with respect to
religious faith. Well aware that we don’t live in an Ideal world, however, he addressed
the very real and prevalent practice of imitation. In his Talks to Teachers, or more
specifically, in the last few chapters entitled “Talks to Students,” James acknowledges
that in attempting change, “it is no small thing to inoculate seventy millions of people
with new standards, yet, if there is to be any relief, that will have to be done.” Doing so,
he says, brings us “back to the psychology of imitation…. There is only one way to
improve ourselves, and that is by some of us setting an example which the others may
pick up and imitate till the new fashion spreads from east to west” (142). In other words,
as he argues throughout most of his work, we are charged with a sense of social
responsibility.
In short, the method that James describes directs us to our daily experiences and
prompts us to ask, ‘What difference would it make to our lives if this notion rather than
that notion were true?’ Answering this question requires us to juxtapose each truth with
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all of our other truths to find which is most useful. The going is admittedly slow and
difficult, and we must keep in mind the power of our previously engrained habits. For as
he writes in Pragmatism, “In respect of the knowledge it contains, the world does
genuinely change and grow,” but for the most part “our knowledge grows in spots” (74).
New thinking comes slowly, and “while these special ideas are being added, the rest of
your knowledge stands still, and only gradually will you ‘line up’ your previous opinions
with the novelties…and modify to some slight degree their mass” (74). Such is the
process of learning, a process that is more often than not “strained, and sometimes
painfully so, between its older beliefs and the novelties which experience brings along”
(74). Nonetheless, it is in this way that our minds grow, James says. They
grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots spread. But we let them
spread as little as possible, we keep unaltered as much of our old
knowledge, as many of our old prejudices and beliefs as we can. We patch
and tinker more than we renew…it happens relatively seldom that the new
fat is added raw. More usually it is embedded cooked, as one might say.
Or stewed down in the sauce of the old. (74-75)
Religion serves as a base for the lives of many students, a base of knowledge from which
they work and to which new notions must be added slowly and with a sympathetic
appreciation for the native inclinations. Religious faith must be allowed its place in the
writing class, but that does not mean it gets a free pass. It competes on an equal playing
field, with all of our other hypotheses, for the right to be called true; i.e., for the right to
be called useful.
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The Responsibility Of Religion
John Dewey’s pragmatism, like the pragmatism of Peirce and James, owes a great
deal to Emerson. Dewey, like James but unlike Peirce, gives Emerson his due on many
occasions; in one such instance he notes that Emerson “would work, he says, by art, not
by metaphysics,” and that “his own preference was to be ranked with the seers rather than
with the reasoners of the race” (West, Evasion 73). Dewey was inspired by the way in
which Emerson “takes the distinctions and classifications which to most philosophers are
true in and of and because of their systems, and makes them true of life, of the common
experience” of everyday people (74). He took pains to point out Emerson’s constant
“reference to immediate life” and the way in which Emerson held the thinking of all the
great philosophers accountable to “present and immediate experience” (74). Building as
well upon James and Peirce, Dewey developed Emerson’s initial notions of experience,
action, and social responsibility to eventually become not only one of America’s greatest
philosophers but also the colossal figure who transformed our approach to education.
His work spans nearly a century—he was born in 1859, two years before the civil war
started, and he died in 1952, two years after the Korean war began. Taking his work as a
whole, pedagogy emerges as a principle preoccupation; specifically, the way in which
pedagogy can help effect democratic change on the streets of the U. S. With respect to
pragmatism, Cornel West argues that after Dewey, “to be a pragmatist is to be a social
critic, literary critic, or a poet—in short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural
creation” (71). West adds that “John Dewey is the culmination of the tradition of
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American pragmatism” and that he “helps us see the complex and mediated ways in
which philosophical problems are linked to societal crises” (71).
Social context was critical to Dewey’s philosophy, especially to his philosophy of
education. He witnessed unprecedented change in his country—a rapid transformation
from a primarily agricultural Republic to the first industrialized, manufacturing nation in
the world. This revolution brought with it as well an overwhelming population boom that
served in large part to support this new way of life. The circumstances surrounding this
new way of life, however, were atrocious; working and living conditions lead, for most,
to poverty, injury, and disease. In Dewey’s mind, the role of education should be first and
foremost directed at improving these conditions. As I cited in the first chapter, he felt that
the school was primarily “a social institution,” and that “education being a social process,
the school is simply a form of community life in which all those agencies are
concentrated that will be most effective in bringing [the student] to share in the inherited
resources of the race, and to use his own powers for social ends (Philosophy 445). In this
regard, school should always be continuous with the rest of life: Dewey was wary that as
“formal teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger of creating an
undesirable split between the experience gained in more direct associations and what is
acquired in school” (Democracy 9). As Emerson reminds us that books are for “the
scholar’s idle time,” so too does Dewey remind us “the true center of correlation on the
school subjects is not science, nor literature, nor history, nor geography, but the child’s
own social activities” (Philosophy 448). In other words, what we do in the classroom
should have everything to do with what our students do in the world.
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Like his pragmatic predecessors, experience plays an integral part in the learning
process. “All genuine education comes about through experience” (507), he writes. And
similar to Paolo Freire’s critique of the “banking method” of education where knowledge
is simply deposited into the passive minds of students and then regurgitated, Dewey
outlines “two senses of the word ‘learning.’”
On the one hand, learning is the sum total of what is known, as that is handed
down by books and learned men. It is something external, an accumulation of
cognitions as one might store material commodities in a warehouse. Truth exists
ready-made somewhere. Study is then the process by which an individual draws
on what is in storage. On the other hand, learning means something which the
individual does when he studies. It is an active, personally conducted affair.
(Democracy 334-335)
The latter sense, of course, is what we need to strive for; acquiring knowledge through an
active search, a search which has a forward motion to it. Akin to this perspective is the
idea that one of the best things we can do for our students is to instill in them the desire to
continue learning on their own after they’ve left us. And to continue learning in the
future, one must look to experience to ascertain the consequences of one’s beliefs. In
Democracy and Education, Dewey draws on Peirce in arguing that “it is the characteristic
use to which the thing is put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the meaning
with which it is identified” (29). Again, force is what force does. In the same vein, as he
suggests that “the very word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in
having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly,” Dewey argues that the
93
“banking method” of education cannot lead to meaning making because most of us leave
the classroom having been thoroughly divided in the following sense:
Something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical
organs of activity. The former is then thought to be purely intellectual and
cognitive; the latter to be an irrelevant and intruding physical factor. The intimate
union of activity and undergoing its consequences which leads to recognition of
meaning is broken. (Philosophy 496)
Any such division of acquiring knowledge is highly suspect, including that which
places science above all else. As James pressed that pragmatism would take any route to
knowledge as long as the outcome proved useful, Dewey insisted that all types of
experience and all kinds of means were necessary in the pursuit of useful truths. “There is
something both ridiculous and disconcerting,” he writes, about the way in which we have
convinced ourselves “to infer that scientific ways of thinking of objects give the inner
reality of things, and that they put a mark of spuriousness upon all other ways of thinking
them, and of perceiving and enjoying them” (West, Evasion 98). Dewey is critical of
institutions like organized religion—more so, perhaps, than James, and certainly more
than Peirce—but he is adamant that we can not summarily exclude a possible way of
knowing, and, conversely, that “there is no kind of inquiry which has a monopoly of the
honorable title of knowledge” (98). Referring again back to Peirce, or, more specifically,
referring back to Peirce’s reference to Jesus, Dewey suggests that no matter how we
arrive at possible truths, it is “by their fruits we shall know them” (98).
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Dewey tries to ground our approach to science, philosophy, religion, and
education by asking us to take a step back and reevaluate the questions we’re asking
instead of putting all of our energy into possible answers. With respect to philosophy, he
argues that we need to get to a point where it “ceases to be a device for dealing with the
problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing
with the problems of men” (101). With respect to education, he likewise suggests that we
spend far too much time just trying to figure out how to respond to the books that we all-
too often passively receive: “Where literature rather than contemporary nature and
society furnishes material of study, methods must be adapted to defining, expounding,
and interpreting the received material, rather than to inquiry, discovery, and invention”
(Democracy 280). This vein of criticism is perhaps most persuasively put in his highly
influential essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” first published in 1917.
Dewey’s principle complaint is that philosophy is mired in questions that are no longer
pertinent; he begins by stating that the essay may
be looked upon as an attempt to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too
intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems. It is not in intent a
criticism of various solutions that have been offered, but raises a question as to
the genuineness, under the present conditions of science and social life, of the
problems. (21)
As Susanne Langer would later emphasize that the way in which we frame our questions
dictates and limits our answers (3), Dewey asks, “Is it not time that philosophers turned
from the attempt to determine the comparative merits of various replies to the questions
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to a consideration of the claims of the questions?” (43). To question our questions in this
sense, we return, of course, to experience. In this same essay, Dewey offers the following
definition of experience:
Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something;
of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words. The
organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequence of its own actions.
Experience, in other words, is a matter of simultaneous doings and
sufferings….And experience is not identical with brain action; it is the entire
organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment, natural and
social. (25-26)
In addition, Dewey draws the distinction between experience and knowledge, citing
experience as “ways of doing and suffering” and knowledge as “discovering what
particular mode—qualitatively unique—of doing and suffering it is” (45). He also asserts
that where modern philosophy does appear to champion experience, “in practice it has
served ideas forced into experience, not gathered from it” (45).
Much of what Dewey says in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” about the
nature of experience and the need to question our questions serves as a base for his
discussion on religion in A Common Faith, published almost two decades later. This little
book (scarcely a book—it’s less than 90 pages) has been largely overlooked in recent
scholarship on Dewey, but it is a book that every composition teacher should read. Like
James’ “Will to Believe,” Dewey does not disavow religious faith; on the contrary, he
tries to make it stronger. But he is often misunderstood as trivializing religious faith
because his central claim in A Common Faith is that religion’s continued association with
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the supernatural has, in the modern day, drained it of its power and rendered it almost
useless. An argument that parallels his discussion of philosophy in “The Need for a
Recovery of Philosophy,” Dewey posits here that we need to stop concerning ourselves
with how to keep responding to the supernatural premise of religious belief and instead
turn our focus to the premise itself. He suggests that “the religious element in life has
been hampered by conceptions of the supernatural that were imbedded in those cultures
wherein man had little control over outer nature and little in the way of sure inquiry and
test.” Science and time have greatly changed our understanding of the world, but Dewey
emphasizes that “this change is not fatal to the religious values in our common
experience, however adverse its impact may be upon historic religions” (Common 56).
The religious attitude, he suggests, has the possibility of doing so much for us, but it must
be freed from its deadening baggage.
Before exploring his argument concerning the supernatural, however, it’s useful I
believe to back up to the beginning for some context and definitions. Many of us might
find, in fact, the very first sentence to be eerily applicable to our country and the world
today: “Never before in history has mankind been so much of two minds, so divided into
two camps, as it is today” (1). The entire first page, actually, speaks in terms of division
and opposition. He describes one camp as those who believe that religious faith in any
form must necessarily be associated with the supernatural, and he describes the other
camp as those who believe that since science has discredited the supernatural aspects of
religion, so too goes all of religion to the dumpster. Dewey attempts to forge a middle
ground by separating religious faith from the supernatural, a middle ground he
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acknowledges will irritate both sides; it will be attacked, he says, by the first group as
undercutting “the vital nerve of the religious element itself” and by the second group as
“a timid half-way position,” an irresponsible “concession and compromise…an emotional
hangover from childhood indoctrination” (3). The rest of the book attempts (successfully,
in my opinion) to assuage these misgivings. Crucial to this attempt is his initial definition
of religion, and his distinction between “religion” and “religious.”
Similar to the way both Peirce and James describe religious faith, Dewey says that
“we are forced to acknowledge that concretely there is no such thing as religion in the
singular. There is only a multitude of religions. ‘Religion’ is a strictly collective term”
(7). Any attempts to pin it down will inevitably prove to be “too much or too little” (7).
Having said that, Dewey draws a sharp distinction between a Religion (as a noun) and the
Religious (as an adjective). The former, he says,
always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of
institutional organization, loose or tight. In contrast, the adjective “religious”
denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a
system of beliefs. It does not denote anything to which one can specifically point
as one can point to this and that historic religion or existing church. For it does
not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a
particular and distinctive form of existence. (10)
Existing “by itself” is a critical difference. A religious attitude, unencumbered by worship
of the supernatural, is obligated to operate in conjunction with the rest of life. But for the
most part, Dewey argues, religion as an institution separates itself from the rest of life,
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and it does so in large part by relying on the supernatural. He describes this division as
follows:
It is of the nature of a religion based on the supernatural to draw a line between
the religious and the secular and the profane, even when it asserts the rightful
authority of the Church and its religion to dominate these other interests. The
conception that “religious” signifies a certain attitude and outlook, independent of
the supernatural, necessitates no such division. It does not shut religious values up
within a particular compartment. (66)
An example of this argument can be seen, I think, in the church’s contemporary struggle
over what to do with homosexuality. The Episcopal church, for instance, recently
appointed for the first time a female Presiding Bishop, Katherine Jefferts Schori (this in
itself represents the church’s attempt to move a little closer to the “religious” attitude
Dewey describes and away from “religion” as an institution associated with the
supernatural—the Christian church and its various derivatives have always treated
women as subordinates based primarily on the word of God). Bishop Schori’s acceptance
of homosexuality and gay marriage represents a growing number of worshipers who are
inclined to apply a religious attitude (as an adjective) to the topic of same-sex
relationships, loosening it from the grip of religion (as a noun), which relies solely on the
word and intention of God for its condemnation.
One of the main problems with religion (as a noun) and its association with the
supernatural is that the resulting division described above renders it less useful to most of
us in a twentieth century, and now twenty-first century, democracy. Worse than useless,
this sense of division has proven harmful, for it often works to pit us against each other.
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As Dewey notes, “It is impossible to ignore the fact that historic Christianity has been
committed to a separation of sheep and goats; the saved and the lost; the elect and the
mass” (84). Such a separation may prove useful for a select few, but the rest of us are
generally out of luck. Religious endeavors that might prove useful for all shouldn’t need
to validate a pre-existing condition. Religious experience doesn’t have to “prove”
something other than what it’s useful for in the moment, for the task at hand. Relatedly,
the meaning of a particular religious experience “is not inherent in the experience itself. It
is derived from the culture with which a particular person has been imbued. A fatalist will
give one name to it; a Christian Scientist another, and the one who rejects all supernatural
being still another” (13). In other words, as James argues, we can’t claim to know things
beforehand. And as Dewey adds, when we make such claims before undergoing the
actual experience and then try to force those claims into the experience, we make a subtle
and dubious shift from religious faith to intellectual certainty. “It is argued,” Dewey
writes,
that the ideal is already the final reality at the heart of things that exist, and that
only our senses or the corruption of our natures prevent us from apprehending its
prior existential being. Starting, say, from such an idea as that justice is more than
a moral ideal because it is embedded in the very make-up of the actually existent
world, men have gone on to build up vast intellectual schemes, philosophies, and
theologies, to prove that ideals are real not as ideals but as antecedently existing
actualities. (21)
In building up such philosophies and theologies, Dewey argues that these claims no
longer inhabit the world of faith, but inhabit rather the world of intellectual reason. For as
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he notes, “Faith that something should be in existence as far as lies in our power is
changed into the intellectual belief that it is already in existence” (21-22). The result is
that active pursuit by the individual for an Ideal is blunted as it has already been provided
as a static intellectual fact. And when actual experiences differ from these pre-existing
facts, reliance on the supernatural slips seamlessly into play—it’s not for us to know, it’s
beyond our grasp, ect.
When religious objects are understood in these intellectual terms, religion itself
becomes a substitute for knowledge, working against rather than with the rest of our
lives. Quoting John Locke, Dewey notes that in this regard, “faith is ‘assent to a
proposition…on the credit of its proposer.’ Religious faith is then given to a body of
propositions as true on the credit of their supernatural author, reason coming in to
demonstrate the reasonableness of giving such credit” (20). Religion finds itself, then,
using reason to convince us that we shouldn’t demand a better reason, resting its claims
on intellectual acquiescence rather than on religious faith. Dewey argues, however,
that religious qualities and values if they are real at all are not bound up with any
single item of intellectual assent, not even that of the existence of the God of
theism; and that, under existing conditions, the religious function in experience
can be emancipated only through surrender of the whole notion of special truths
that are religious by their own nature, together with the idea of peculiar avenues
of access to such truths. (32-33)
Dewey suggests that the entire conflict between religion and science boils down to
knowing before-hand (based upon intellectual assent to supernatural authority) and not
knowing before-hand (giving in to contingency, chaos, and imagination). Further, we
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don’t really need to know before-hand—we don’t need “dogma and doctrine” to be
religious, he says, because as social beings we already have a vested stake in things like
kindness and justice, and in a modern democracy we no longer need religion (as a noun)
to police our actions.
Ultimately, Dewey works to distinguish the “difference between an experience
having a religious force because of what it does in and to the processes of living and
religious experience as a separate kind of thing…” (14). What we label as religious or
religion can not be “marked off,” he says, from all of our other experiences and activities
“to validate a belief in some special kind of object and also to justify some special kind of
practice” (10, 11). His definition in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” that
experience “is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of
suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words” (25), rings even
louder with respect to religion where people generally have a more intimate bond, and
where so often “interpretations of the experience have not grown from the experience
itself…they have been imported by borrowing without criticism from ideas that are
current in the surrounding culture” (36). In this latter sense experience becomes stagnant
and, therefore, useless. As Dewey notes in Experience and Education, not “all
experiences are genuinely or equally educative,” and that any particular “experience is
mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further
experience” (Philosophy 507). The value of experience is contingent, then—it must lead
to “the possibilities of having richer experience in the future…” (507), for “every
experience lives on in further experiences” (508). From Emerson to Dewey, the
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pragmatists look ahead and argue that we must focus on the experience itself to draw our
conclusions for the future rather than using the experience to justify a preconceived
notion from the past. Dewey concludes that in order to do this, we need to disassociate
religious experience from the supernatural.
Not an easy task, to say the least. As James talks of our habitual native tendencies,
Dewey too recognizes that “tradition and custom, especially when emotionally charged,
are a part of the habits that have become one with our very being” (Common 15). Indeed,
“the emotional deposit connected with prior teaching floods the whole situation” (13).
But this charge of emotion doesn’t have to be an obstacle; it can be an ally in bringing
about such a change. As Dewey says that intelligence “is inherently involved in action,”
he says too that,
moreover, there is no opposition between [intelligence] and emotion. There is
such a thing as passionate intelligence…The whole story of man shows that there
are no objects that may not deeply stir engrossing emotion. One of the few
experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is
that of devotion, so intense as to be religious, to intelligence as a force in social
action. (79)
As it currently stands, religion (as a noun) rejects natural intelligence and in its place
manufactures an un-natural (or supernatural) intelligence to co-mingle with emotion. In
“Morality is Social,” Dewey writes that in such a state, religion
has been perverted into something uniform and immutable. It has been formulated
into fixed and defined beliefs expressed in required acts and ceremonies. Instead
of marking the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite
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whole, it has been petrified into a slavery of thought and sentiment, an intolerant
superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the part of the
many. (Philosophy 723)
If he sounds harsh here, and not quite within the boundaries of a “middle ground”
approach, it is only because he sees the possibility of religious belief as enormously
invaluable if directed at the real problems of real people. Understood as such, Dewey
unequivocally emphasizes the importance of faith, for it encompasses “all that is
significant in human experience…” (Common 57). And he is not arguing for what might
be called a “secular” church; rather, he is arguing for a religious approach to the world
that allows for worldly intellectual inquiry. In this regard, he suggests that our prospects
lie in “the marriage of emotion with intelligence” (80), a marriage that can only result
from redirecting religious faith back toward everyday human experience without the
baggage of the otherworldly. Such a “transfer of idealizing imagination, thought, and
emotion to natural human relations would not signify the destruction of churches that
now exist. It would rather offer a means for a recovery of vitality” (82).
With the help of the method that Peirce, James, and Dewey provide, as writing
teachers we can frame our discussion of religion in terms of negotiating the consequences
of all of our beliefs. Just as we might with any other social or political issue, we may
prompt our students to critically examine our habitual propensity for religious belief. In
his conclusion to The Varieties of Religious Experience, James asks, “is the existence of
so many religious types and sects and creeds regrettable?” To his own question he
answers “‘No’ emphatically” (487), and he goes on to give his reasons why. I disagree
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with his answer and his reasons, and I think that James would be just as happy that I do.
It is not about finding the right solution, it’s about working towards a better condition. In
the classroom we can only start working towards dialogue by beginning with the premise
that both “sides” offer live options: it’s possible that there might be a God and it’s
possible that there might not be a God. The approach I outlined above can help us from
there by further framing the discussion in terms of contingency, not dogma; imagination,
not rules; chaos, not precision; hybridity, not separation. Such an approach can provide us
a place to start talking about religious faith in the composition class.
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CHAPTER IV
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS IN THE CLASSROOM
Whatever inspiration is, it’s born
from a continuous “I Don’t Know”…
Knowledge that doesn’t lead to new questions
quickly dies out. It fails to maintain the temperature
required for sustaining life.
Wislawa Szymborska
In the last two chapters I have argued that we must start talking about religious
faith in the composition classroom much as we talk about race, class, and gender, and I
have turned to the American Pragmatists to help us begin. Many readers at this juncture,
however, might be inclined to respond, “that sounds nice, but how will it really play out
in my classroom? How, for instance, am I going to address a student’s urge to
proselytize? How am I going to curtail another student’s derisive reaction to such
proselytizing? And how should my own religious belief, or lack thereof, factor into the
mix?” Part of this chapter aims to address these sorts of concerns; from the outset,
however, I want to highlight one way in which discussing religion in the classroom is
fundamentally different from talking about race, class, or gender. With respect to the
latter, there is a basic understanding (or so we hope) that racism, classism, and sexism are
necessarily bad things; we need to work together to rid society of these hurtful attitudes.
Whether or not everybody in the classroom really agrees with this premise, everyone in
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the classroom acknowledges that that is the assumption and, for the most part, they go
along with it (either sincerely or quietly resigned). With respect to religious faith, we are
not initially operating from this basic understanding. In this sense, talking about
something like homophobia is easier because, while we still might not be completely
comfortable with it, we are, in a Socratic kind of way through a series of questions and
proddings, trying to lead them to a foregone conclusion: homophobia is bad. Do what you
can to get rid of it.
While a few of us might like to lead our students to the same foregone conclusion
about religious belief, this is not likely how most of us feel; nor is it an advisable means
for approaching the topic; nor is it by any stretch the message of this dissertation, as I
hope the pragmatic approach sketched out above makes clear. Because we are not
operating from an initial understanding that religious faith is necessarily a bad thing like
racism or homophobia, we need to pay particular attention to our approach. As a method
only and not a hoped-for conclusion, pragmatism pushes us to read, write, think, and talk
about religion in a way that both respects it as a possible option and includes it among
our re-vision of habits from the perspective that we do not indeed know beforehand. The
present chapter offers some practical tips for applying this method.
Framing the Issue
Religious faith is often referred to as a “conversation stopper,” or as something
that lies just outside the boundaries of discourse precisely because folks on both sides feel
deep down that they do, in fact, already “know.” One of the most challenging aspects,
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then, of undertaking a pluralistic, pragmatic approach to faith in the writing class is
overcoming well-entrenched allegiances to venerable claims of knowledge. It seems like
an overwhelming task, but we will feel more comfortable about working with this topic
when we start to address it proactively; that is, when we have a plan. We must first,
however, feel secure that it is our place as educators to hold up religious faith as a subject
of critical inquiry (my hope is that chapter one convincingly made this argument), and we
must take care to make sure that we establish in ourselves a sympathetic inclination to
this potentially explosive issue. Having oriented ourselves in this direction, we can frame
this undertaking for our students as a project of inquiry with no preconceived
conclusions. We might, in fact, liken this project to that of the Final Portfolio: the focus is
on the process, on real reflection, on working through something without knowing
exactly where it will lead us. Our goal at the end of the semester is to have, through a
variety of means, productively interrogated and reflected upon our topic. As this goal is
intentionally vague, however, we need to take extra pains in mapping out our terrain.
In God: A Biography, Jack Miles introduces his subject in a way we might be able
to mimic. Miles states very clearly from the beginning, “I write here about the life of the
Lord God as—and only as—the protagonist of a classic of world literature.” He adds, “I
do not write about (though I certainly do not write against) the Lord God as the object of
religious belief. I do not attempt, as theology does, to make an original statement about
God as an extraliterary reality” (10). He also claims in his introduction that “Knowledge
of God as a literary character neither precludes nor requires belief in God, and it is this
kind of knowledge that the book before you attempts to mediate” (4). We are not talking
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about God as a literary character, but we can circumscribe our project in a similar
fashion. We might make very clear in our syllabus and on the first day of class that we
are not attempting here “to make an original statement” about the reality of God; rather,
we are attempting to enhance our knowledge and understanding of religious faith as a
social and political player in our country and in the world. Further, aiming to enhance our
knowledge and understanding in this regard “neither precludes nor requires belief in
God.” We might also let our students know that we see writing and writing instruction as
intimately bound up with the world in which we live, hence our writing courses often
take as their themes social and political issues. We will discuss religious faith in here as
just that and nothing more—a social and political issue worthy of our attention and
discussion. To return to the difference between interrogating race, class, or gender in the
writing class and interrogating religious faith, it is critical, I believe, to position faith not
as something that needs our attention in the way that AIDS needs our attention, but rather
something worthy of our attention because it holds the possibility of being such a positive
force in our lives. If students feel their faith is under attack (and, by extension, that they
themselves are under attack), we will have an uphill battle to say the least. We can
indicate as much in the front matter of our syllabus, but there’s no substitute for a
teacher’s continuous sincere and active attempt to approach this topic not as a cancer to
be eradicated, but as a potential catalyst for human happiness.
Regarding the mechanics of timing, it should go without saying (but I’ll say it
anyway) that we shouldn’t “surprise” our students with this topic three weeks into the
semester. It can, of course, be reasonably expected that some students will not want to
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write about religious faith in the classroom setting, much less talk about it in a large
group discussion. Forcing the issue, I think it’s safe to say, would be counter-productive.
Common sense dictates that the content of the course is available for students to see
before they sign up, and that the agenda is made clear on the first day of class. My guess,
though, based on my own experiences, the experiences of colleagues, and the “pulse” of
the nation as a whole, is that such a course won’t go begging for students. As Pricilla
Perkins relates with respect to writing teachers at her university in Oklahoma, “as careful
as they were to cordon off all Bible talk, students still found opportunities to bring it in to
their classrooms” (587). The interest is there. We just need to map out our approach.
Questioning Authority
I suspect that the elephant in the room, however, still needs to be addressed. As
my brother put it to me on the phone recently while we were discussing this project,
“despite your middle ground approach and these sort of careful formulations, how do you
compete with a lifetime of teaching by parents and pastors?” The answer, I believe, is
that we shouldn’t see ourselves as having to compete. In a more academic sense, we
don’t have to compete because, as Santiago Zabala suggests, “after modernity, there are
no more strong philosophical reasons either to be an atheist refusing religion or to be a
theist refusing science; the deconstruction of metaphysics has cleared the ground for a
culture without those dualisms….In this postmodern condition, faith…absorbs these
dualisms without recognizing in them any reasons for conflict” (Rorty and Vattimo 2). In
a less academic sense, we don’t have to compete simply because the purpose stated on
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our syllabus says so. The project is not set forth in terms of which “side” can prove this
or that in the end. It’s set forth in terms of interrogating our habits with respect to a
volatile social issue for the purpose of further reflection. In addition, we shouldn’t feel
the need to compete with the dogmatic history of organized religion when we prompt our
students to ask hard questions because questioning authority has never been an
exclusively secular practice. Catholics and Christians have always had a strong history of
“bucking the system.” In support of this contention, I’ll point to my own background
first, and then to a number of different voices and scholars.
Although my parents (and subsequently my brother and sister and I) left the
church when I was a teenager, we come from a strong Catholic background—most of my
extended family (and being Catholic, there are about two hundred of us) still attend
church on a regular basis and to varying degrees appear to be motivated by religious
faith. When my grandma recently died, my aunt Jeannie read a moving piece at the
funeral. At one point, she described how my grandma withdrew her membership from
“Daughters of the Revolution” because this storied organization began to align itself with
racist policies. My aunt relayed how sad and angry my grandma was about the whole
episode—for years she was proud of her membership in this group, but she couldn’t
condone nor be associated with what it had become. In many ways her membership in
this group had been intimately bound up with her faith, but Jeannie quoted my grandma
as saying, “being Catholic means helping people, and to help people we have to try to
make things better. A lot of times that means changing what you’ve been doing, even if
you’ve been doing it for a long time and you don’t really want to [change].” Most of the
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Catholics I know, both family members and other acquaintances, have given me the
impression that their faith is not synonymous with blind obedience. I’ve heard them
disagree with their pastors, argue over the meaning of scripture, ect. In other words, for
these people, the word of God is subject to change and interpretation.
As I was beginning to think about this topic, I came across an article in Time
magazine that seemed to sum up for me much of the attitude that my relatives take to
religious faith. Regarding the current sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church, this
issue advertises on the cover “Catholics In Revolt” in reference to its article, “Rebels In
The Pews: No Matter What Their Bishops Decide, Catholic Lay People Say It Is Time
For Their Voice To Be Heard.” The article recounts how practitioners have formed
groups across the country and called for reform, like the “‘Voice of the Faithful,’ which
wants to turn the church into a representative democracy” (Biema 55). The article ends
with a confessional entitled “Who Says The Church Can’t Change?: An Anguished
Catholic Argues That Loving The Church Means Reforming It” (63). Here, Andrew
Sullivan articulates some of what I hear from my relatives and also some of what I hear
in the pragmatic approach I described in Chapter Two. “Even when [the Church] inflicted
real pain,” Sullivan says, “when it callously treated women as second-class Catholics,
when it wounded good people in bad marriages, when it penetrated into the souls of
young gay kids and made them hate themselves, I knew that it was a human institution on
a divine mission. Human institutions fail. But, I reminded myself, they can also change”
(63). While James and Dewey might disagree with the reference to a “divine mission,”
they, as well as the Catholics I know, would certainly champion the notion that change
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does not mean discarding one’s faith. On the contrary. As Sullivan concludes with
respect to the sexual abuse scandals, “what we have witnessed means we would be
delinquent if we didn’t fight for real change. We are actually being more faithful than
those who want to perpetuate the conditions for further decline” (64).
While many scholars and theologians would support Sullivan’s position, there
persists the popular notion that iron-clad dogma dictates the behavior of all worshipers.
For instance, as Mano Singham describes in his book Quest for Truth, a common
perception of “religious belief structures [is that they] usually have an unchanging
core….” Followers “do not probe for inconsistencies or periodically replace their old
beliefs with new ones in the light of new knowledge. Indeed, the unchanging nature of
core religious beliefs is considered to be one of its main virtues, a reflection of its eternal
truth” (167). There are, to be sure, worshipers who understand their faith in these terms,
and, to be sure, faith in these terms is more likely to make the headlines as political
banter or the impetus of sensational acts. In practice, however, what Singham describes is
only one part of the story. We can look first, for instance, to the Bible. As Alicia Ostriker
notes, a close reading of “the Bible is to recognize that sacred writ is intrinsically no
more absolute in its authority than any other writing” (61). Ostriker tells us, in fact, that
the questioning of authority, including divine authority, has been built into
Judaism in several different ways. From the moment God confides to Abraham
his intention to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah, and Abraham is appalled and
replies, ‘Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justly?’—making clear that he,
Abraham, thinks God has no right to harm innocent people—the right and even
the duty of God’s children to interrogate their father becomes a recurrent Biblical
theme. (58)
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In addition to the Bible, we can also look to contemporary leaders of the Roman
Catholic Church regarding the issue of inflexible dogma. As Carol Jablonski notes with
respect to the Church’s position on gender roles, Pope John XXIII “helped to open up the
Church’s thinking on women by acknowledging, without disparagement, that women’s
roles are changing and by affirming that women can contribute to society by working
outside the home” (165). In the mid 1960s, in fact, Pope John put forth a decidedly
human rights agenda, asserting that “every type of discrimination, whether social or
cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion, is to be
overcome and eradicated as contrary to God’s intent” (166). In our effort to bridge the
gap between the goals of a critical liberatory writing class and students who may hold
fundamentalist beliefs, we may look to the work of this Pope which in large part posits
that reinterpretation and critical thinking are not only possible but necessary aspects of a
healthy religious faith. In framing a discussion about the institution of marriage, for
instance, we might point to his statement that “human beings have the right to choose
freely the state of life which they prefer” (166).
And the Pope, of course, is only one example in this regard. There are countless
“high profile” and “low profile” people of faith who we can enlist to buttress our push to
question what has been handed to us. Mary Daly, for instance, who, as a Catholic,
worked to make God a “Verb who is the most active of all verbs” and strove to reclaim
for women “the power of their own speech” within the Catholic church (Jablonski 168).
The thinking of theologian Lesslie Newbigin can help us as well. In “‘A Radical
Conversion of the Mind’: Fundamentalism, Hermeneutics, and the Metanoic Classroom,”
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Priscilla Perkins argues that Newbigin “describes a Christian way of knowing that
provokes comparison to the hermeneutical writing pedagogies advocated by Spellmyer,
Bartholomae, Qualley, and others” (596). Perkins suggests that Newbigin calls for a
“rearrangement of our mental furniture” and, Perkins argues, his new definition of the
pivotal Greek term “metanoia” as a “‘radical conversion of the mind’ represents a
provocative break with several centuries of Christian translation: wherever the term or its
cognates appear in the Greek New Testament, English translators have replaced it with
‘repentance,’ a word that implies a remorseful turn away from disobedience, rather than
an active embrace of unfamiliar possibilities” (597). Perkins argues that critical
composition instructors should invoke Newbigin’s definition of the original term
“metanoia” because the word “repentance” that English translators decided to insert “has
no place…in a progressive writing pedagogy. Newbigin’s more faithful, more forward –
looking definition of ‘metanoia,’ however, is clearly relevant to our work” (597).
As I have read for this project, I have found more and more voices of faith who
align their religious beliefs with questioning authority. In “(Sacra) Mentality: Catholic
Identity in the Postmodern Classroom,” Jeffrey Cain concludes that “the organism of
religion absolutely requires doubt, without which there would be no fall from grace, no
test of faith, no teleology. Doubt thus plays a positive role, since uncertainty provides a
moment of flight from absolute authority, and it is in this moment that immanence
unfolds itself” (179). Likewise, in a book review of Nel Noddings’ Educating for
Intelligent Belief and Unbelief, Todd DeStigter writes that while “Noddings doesn’t say
so explicitly, at the core of her ambitious project is the need to foster in teachers an
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understanding of faith that I once heard articulated from a Presbyterian pulpit: ‘The
opposite of faith is not doubt; the opposite of faith is certainty’” (78). I could continue
with such examples, but I’ll stop here. In short, what I’ve learned from my research is
consistent with the “critical faith” I have seen and heard from numerous members of my
own family. In their homes, at church, and on the street, I feel it safe to conclude that vast
numbers of worshipers see their faith as intricately bound up with critical inquiry. It
follows that we shouldn’t view it as a stretch to develop or expect such an intermingling
in the contemporary critical composition class.
Activities and Texts
In this section I offer a handful of suggestions for texts, assignments, and
activities that might prove useful in organizing this class. Earlier I made a brief reference
to the Writing Portfolio; I believe the topic of religious belief lends itself to the way in
which the Portfolio emphasizes process, revision, and reflection, so I will tailor my
following suggestions around such an approach (the Final Portfolio assignment, however,
is certainly not obligatory). However they are taken, all of these suggestions are rooted in
and work to foster our pragmatic approach to religious belief by bringing it within the
purview of analyzing our habits and a priori judgments. I break this section into four
parts: Questionaires and Freewrites, Texts, Debates and Group Presentations, and Writing
Assignments.
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Questionaires and Freewrites
After spelling out precisely the purpose of this class (to develop writing and
critical thinking skills by exploring religion as, and only as, a social and political issue),
and after providing for them our own working definition of “religious belief” (as I
outlined in my Introduction, for my purposes here it is Christianity), one of the first
things we might do is offer our students a questionnaire to get their input and their assent.
We might begin by simply asking them, “How would you define religious belief? How
does your definition differ from the one I provided in this class? Can you accept the
definition provided in this class for the purposes of our project this semester?” In this
initial questionnaire, we might also ask something like the following: “Do ‘scientific
knowledge’ and ‘religious knowledge’ serve different purposes? How do we judge the
usefulness or value of each? Do you think, in the twenty-first century, that it’s possible
for religious knowledge and scientific knowledge to compliment each other in a
productive way?” These are only suggestions—the idea is to get in writing (in a
contractual sort of way) that students accept the “terms” of this project and to get some of
their general impressions on the topic at the very beginning of the semester. At the end of
the semester, we might suggest that students look at this questionnaire again (maybe in a
reflection letter for their Final Portfolio) and ask them if they would still define religious
belief in the same way. Would they answer the other questions exactly the same? In other
words, have any of their experiences over the last 15 weeks prompted them to rethink
beliefs they hold to be true? We should be clear here, of course, that there is no penalty
for reaching or not reaching a particular conclusion—penalty only attaches if there has
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been no substantial reflection or inquiry or explication as to why they have arrived where
they have.
Freewriting prompts can be initially used in a similar way to help orient the class
as a whole. At the outset, we could tell our students who Pierce, James, and Dewey are,
their distinct personal beliefs about God, and why we’re basing our approach on their
thinking. We can subsequently ask them at various times over the first couple of weeks to
freewrite in response to prompts like the following: “C. S. Peirce suggests that religion is
what religion does. What does this mean to you? Do you agree with this statement?”
Or, “William James says the truth about God must run the gauntlet of all our other truths,
and vice versa. Do you agree? Is this possible?” Or maybe, “John Dewey says it’s
possible to be a religious person without believing in a supernatural deity. Do you agree?
Does this distort the term ‘religious’?” We might also ask them to respond to Pierce’s
suggestion that God must be understood in vague terms, or to James’s insistence that we
have a right “to believe in religious matters,” or to Dewey’s distinction between
“religion” as a noun and “religious” as an adjective.
In addition to Pierce, James, and Dewey, we might add some freewriting prompts
by some more contemporary voices, from both sides of the “isle,” to further help students
enter our discussion about the place of religious faith in the public sphere. The market is
saturated (although there always seems to be room for more) with books on this topic
from every perspective; I recommend six that I feel teachers will find useful in this
context. God’s Politics by Jim Wallis, The Purpose Driven Life by Rick Warren, and the
Left Behind series by Tim LaHaye advocate, to varying degrees, the necessity of
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religious faith in the public and political sphere. Many of our students may already be
familiar with these works as they are, especially the last two, astoundingly popular
(LaHaye’s series has sold 60 million copies, and Warren’s book has been translated into
56 languages and has spent 174 weeks on the New York Times Best Seller List for advice
books). They provide almost endless possibilities for freewriting prompts. Richard
Dawkins’ The God Delusion, Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell, and Sam Harris’
Letter to a Christian Nation provide, as one might guess, arguments against the
usefulness of religious faith in the public realm. These too are in demand at the moment
(although their combined sales can’t compare to LaHaye’s alone), and they offer a wealth
of possible prompts. None of the books I listed offer much in the way of compromise or
common ground—if they did, my guess is that they probably wouldn’t be so popular in
our sharply divided nation. Our job is to acknowledge and scrutinize these pervasive,
polarized positions that largely represent our country, squaring them up against each
other and asking what difference would it make to all of us here and now if this belief
rather than that belief were true.
Students can freewrite, of course, in response to a variety of texts, current events,
or class discussions, and these freewrites may often serve as a springboard for debate
topics, group presentations, papers, ect. One example I like in particular draws on Ann
Berthoff’s Double-Entry Journal exercise. We might ask students to watch t.v., search the
internet, and read the paper over the weekend and then jot down one instance where
religious faith made the news (we might also add that simply noting how a church moved
from one corner to another does not represent the depth of observation we’re looking
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for). On one side of a sheet of paper, students should write down their initial response to
their observation—what happened and what was their first reaction to it? They should not
look at it again until they come to class on Monday, where we allot the first ten minutes
or so for them to respond to their first response on the other side of the same sheet of
paper. Using this same exercise, we might also ask students to write about specific
current events we already have in mind. For example, at the beginning of class we can
ask them to freewrite on the following prompt: “Should a pharmacist (licensed by the
state) have the right to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions because that pharmacist
believes that to fill such prescriptions would violate his/her religious views?” At the end
of class, or perhaps at the beginning of the following class, they can respond to their first
response on the blank side of the page. Again, the idea is to prompt students to think
about their thinking, to interrogate some of their beliefs after bringing them to the surface
for a moment.
However we use them, our freewriting prompts should embody the spirit of the
pragmatic method; in other words, they should not covertly lead our students in one
direction or another. As it’s fair to say that many students will assume we want them to
reach a certain conclusion (like we do with racism or sexism), we must be sure—
especially during those first few days—to let them know otherwise. And how we phrase
our questions, as Susanne Langer reminds us, directs the response we are likely to get. In
this respect, we might do well to keep in the back of our minds Kenneth Burke’s parlor
metaphor, where we can see ourselves as entering an ongoing conversation which began
before we arrived and which will continue after we’re gone. We don’t enter the room
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already knowing the answers—we enter the room as new participants who must listen,
evaluate, reevaluate, contribute, and eventually leave. To take one example, Rick Warren,
whose book The Purpose Driven Life I mentioned above, recently invited Barrack
Obama to speak at his mega-church in California. This invitation sparked some
controversy given Obama’s views on abortion and his alliance with the Democratic party.
In the spirit of entering Burke’s parlor, we might ask our students to respond to this
particular invitation: “Why the controversy? What are the issues here? What would you
offer to this ongoing conversation?” However we phrase them, our prompts should lead
to more questions, not to foregone conclusions, in an attempt at leaving behind a parlor
with a better chance at improving our collective condition.
Texts
In offering here a handful of texts that will press our students to explore the way
in which faith functions as a public and political force, I draw on different genres from
both academic and popular culture circles. I list and briefly describe the works, and I
often suggest how they might be used together. In the following two sections, I will offer
more specific assignments and activities that we may use in conjunction with these and
other texts. As the possibilities for texts in a class like this are boundless, my intention is
that these examples will be taken as just that—examples.
In the popular film version of John Grisham’s book A Time to Kill, starring
Samuel L. Jackson, Sandra Bullock, and Matthew McConaughey, religious faith is not a
dominant theme, but one sequence of scenes proves productive for our purposes. In this
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movie, which takes place in the south, a young white lawyer (McConaughey) tries to
defend a black man (Jackson) for murdering the two white Klansmen who raped his
daughter. About half-way through the film, in the span of less than thirty seconds, we see
the Klu Klux Klan members attending their church service; this scene cuts immediately
to McConaughey and his family attending their church service; and this scene cuts
immediately to the black family members of Jackson singing in their church. We might
ask our students how these scenes invite us to react to the function of faith—are we to be
repulsed by the first, relate to or feel indifference for the second, and sympathize deeply
with the third? In our first week we might begin by showing this clip from a film that
many students are either familiar with or can relate to on some level, and we might also
ask them to interrogate their own subject positions in relation to this text. How did they
respond individually to these scenes? Why? What do they think a typical audience is
supposed to come away with here? Is the director pushing towards a pragmatic notion
that “faith is what faith does?”
We can use this movie in conjunction with other works that deal with race to
explore the role faith has played in the abolition movement or in the civil rights
movement? For example, taken together, Frederick Douglass’ Narrative and his “Fourth
of July” speech provide us with some interesting material. At the end of chapter 5 in his
Narrative, Douglass describes his response to the “remarkable” circumstances
surrounding his escape from slavery:
I may be deemed superstitious, and even egotistical, in regarding this event as a
special interposition of divine Providence in my favor. But I should be false to the
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earliest sentiments of my soul, if I suppressed the opinion. I prefer to be true to
myself, even at the hazard of incurring the ridicule of others, rather than be false,
and incur my own abhorrence….in the darkest hours of my career in slavery, this
living word of faith and spirit of hope departed not from me, but remained like
ministering angels to sheer me through the gloom. This good spirit was from God,
and to him I offer thanksgiving and praise. (56)
Seven years after writing these words, he writes the following in his famous “Fourth of
July Speech”: “Albert Barnes but uttered what the common sense of every man at all
observant of the actual state of the case will receive as truth, when he declared that ‘there
is no power out of the church that could sustain slavery an hour, if it were not sustained
in it’” (Bizzell and Herzberg 225). How might we account for these seemingly
contradictory descriptions of religious belief from the same person? Did he simply
change his mind during the intervening years? Might Dewey’s distinction between
religion as a noun and religious as an adjective apply? How else might the pragmatic
method help us reconcile these statements? “Joining the Church” by Henry Louis Gates
Jr. also lends itself well to these particular questions as Gates describes the power of his
faith and his experiences in the Christian church. Martin Luther King’s “Letter from
Birmingham Jail” leads us in a similar direction. In this letter, King describes his
disappointment with the white church, details how one can be deeply disappointed only
with something that one deeply loves, and offers hope that the church will rise to the
challenge of reorienting itself. After a lesson on Aristotle’s rhetorical triangle, we could
ask students how King establishes and works from his own ethos as a Christian in this
piece and how that ethos aligns (or doesn’t align) with a pragmatic approach to religious
faith. How does he go about criticizing the Church? What pathetic appeals does he make
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to people of faith? We might also include here critical responses to King’s method,
including Will Herberg’s “A Religious ‘Right’ to Violate the Law” and T. Olin Binkley’s
“Southern Baptist Seminaries.” Judging these responses by the same pragmatic criteria,
how might we rank their usefulness?
Sarah Grimke and Pyllis Schlafly are two authors we can turn to with respect to
the role of religious faith regarding women’s rights. In “Letters on the Equality of the
Sexes and the Condition of Women,” Grimke responds directly to a “Pastoral Letter”
which, citing the Bible, argues that essentially “The power of woman is in her
dependence” (Bizzell and Herzberg 305). Also working from the Bible, Grimke offers a
different perspective, taking issue at one point with the popular tenet that women need to
be protected by men. Referring to “the gentle appellation of protection,” Grimke argues
that more often than not what women “have leaned upon has proved a broken reed at
best, and oft a spear” (325). Contemporary writer Phyllis Schlafly (author of 21 books,
including Equal Pay for Unequal Work and A Choice not an Echo) disagrees with
Grimke’s position on protection. In her opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment,
Schlafly argued that the ERA “would take away the ‘special protection’ the ‘Christian
tradition of chivalry’ offered women—in other words, the ‘right’ to be ‘supported and
protected’ by men” (Critchlow 138). Taking these positions together, how does religious
faith help to define popular beliefs about protection? If we run these beliefs through the
pragmatic gauntlet of all our other truths, how do they stack up? Again, the goal is to
prompt our students to question “what difference would it make” if this belief rather than
that one were true. Christine De Pisan’s The Book of the City of Ladies, Albert Folsom’s
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“Abolition Women,” Jonathan Stearns’ “Female Influence, and the True Christian Mode
of its Exercise,” Judy Syfers’ “I Want a Wife,” and Adrienne Rich’s “The Domestication
of Motherhood” are just a few other texts to consider on a woman’s “place” in the context
of religious belief.
Exploring the public role of faith through a pragmatic lens, we might, of course,
take as our impetus a number of cultural studies topics like race and gender; I’ll offer
here briefly just two more examples. With respect to Native American studies, we may
explore Mary Rolandson’s A Narrative of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary
Rowlandson together with pieces like A Brief History of the War with the Indians in New
England by Increase Mather, Speech at the end of King Philip’s War by Waban, and
Eulogy on King Philip by William Apess. These works offer distinct and compelling
accounts of how God and the Bible took part in this particular context (I won’t burden my
reader by reiterating possible pragmatic prompts—I trust those have become evident by
now). We might also investigate the role that faith continues to play in the ongoing
debate surrounding evolution. To frame our discussion we could begin with selected
excerpts from Darwin’s Origin of Species and C. S. Pierce’s “Evolutionary Love.” We
can then include a variety of perspectives from texts like Debby Applegate’s The Most
Famous Man in America: The Biography of Henry Ward Beecher and Stephen Jay
Gould’s Evolution as Fact and Theory; we can also bring in current events like the
outcomes of recent court cases in Kansas and Pennsylvania regarding the place of
Intelligent Design and Darwin’s theory of evolution in public school curricula. In
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addition, we might look back to H. L. Mencken’s “On the Scopes Trial” as well as to
various examples of public discourse on this matter from the news and the internet.
With the exception of one film, so far I have focused primarily on essays,
nonfiction, and current events. I will turn now briefly to some possibilities from the
genres of poetry, fiction, and drama. From the same pragmatic perspective and with the
same goal of exploring the public function of religious belief, we might consider a poem
like Ann Bradstreet’s “The Flesh and the Spirit” as a center piece for our work with
poetry. The following excerpt from this poem, in which Spirit replies to her sister Flesh,
might be worth emphasizing for our purposes:
Spirit: Be still, thou unregenerate part,
Disturb no more my settled heart,
For I have vowed (and so will do)
Thee as a foe still to pursue.
And combat with thee will and must,
Until I see thee laid in th’ dust.
Sisters we are, yea, twins we be,
Yet deadly feud ‘twixt thee and me; (138)
From such a foundation (questioning whether or not having a “settled heart” necessarily
leads to confrontation), we can consider countless other poets, such as T.S. Eliot (“The
Waste Land”), Emily Dickinson (“‘Faith’ is a fine invention,” “Some Keep the Sabbath
Going to Church,” “I Dwell in Possibility,”) Bryce Perce Shelly (“England in 1819”) and
Langston Hughes (“God to Hungry Child”). With respect to short fiction, we may take as
our centerpiece a story like William Saroyan’s “Resurrection of a Life” and emphasize,
perhaps, an excerpt like this one:
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…all that I know is that I am alive and glad to be, glad to be of this ugliness and
this glory, somehow glad that I can remember, somehow remember the boy
climbing the fig tree, unpraying but religious with joy, somehow of the earth, of
the time of earth, somehow everlastingly of life, nothingness, blessed or
unblessed, somehow deathless like myself, timeless, glad, insanely glad to be
here, and so it is true, there is no death, somehow there is no death, and can never
be. (168)
Again, from such a starting point regarding the consequences of religious belief, we
might explore a myriad of short stories, such as those by Flannery OConnor (“Good
Country People,” “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” “Revelation”), Philip Roth (“Defender
of the Faith”), Richard Wright (“Bright and Morning Star”), Anton Chekov (“The
Student”), and Tomas Rivera (“…And the Earth did not Part”).
I will also recommend a novel and a play that I have had success with in talking
about the public role of religion: Bernard Malamud’s The Fixer and Tony Kushner’s
Angels in America. In the beginning of The Fixer, set in anti-Semitic Tsarist Russia,
Yakov Bok responds to his step-father’s admonition “Don’t forget your God!” by
replying, “Who forgets who…what do I get from him from but a bang on the head and a
stream of piss in my face” (17). As the novel progresses, however, Yakov’s “Jewishness”
is increasingly thrust upon him, and, while attempting to take up Spinoza’s theology, he
struggles to understand what religion has done to him (and others) and what it could do
for him (and others). How Yakov and his religion are eventually portrayed as inextricably
bound, and how together they are ultimately understood as both a part of and a
consequence of history and politics, is also particularly appealing for our project.
Kushner’s play, set in the Reagan 80’s and featuring Roy Cohn, a gay couple facing
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AIDS, and a Mormon couple confronting drug addiction and latent homosexuality, offers
a number of different characters and angles to focus upon. The social structure as well as
the spiritual center of religion lies at the heart of this play, and there is an interesting
theme of duality that runs throughout it, i.e., a pattern in the play whereby things usually
considered as opposites are woven together, such as being both Mormon and gay, real
and hallucinatory, tragic and comic, political and personal, a character and an archetype,
a “sinner” seduced by angels, and so on. The way in which the play ultimately depicts a
Godless heaven and a God who can be sued for abandonment also fits into this same
pattern and provides us ample material to work with regarding themes of mediation and
hybridity. In addition, both Malamud’s novel and Kushner’s play have been made into
movies which can serve as interesting compliments.
The literary examples I listed above offer a variety of hypotheses about the nature
and effect of religious faith in a social context. We can use texts like these to prompt
students to think about how religious faith constructs our subjective views of the world.
How might Flannery O’Connor’s religious subjectivity determine the arc of her story?
How might Bernard Malamud’s religious subjectivity determine the outcome of his
novel? How do our students’ religious subjectivities effect their readings of these texts?
How are their readings useful to themselves and to their neighbors? How might their
readings be different given a different set of religious beliefs? With respect to this last
question, I’ll end this section by referring back to William James’ The Varieties of
Religious Experience. By the end of this book, James seems to conclude that having a
variety of religious experience in the world is, for the most part, a good thing. He writes,
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“I do not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions and with such
different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same functions and
the same duties. No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to
work out identical solutions” (419). He adds that the divine means a “group of qualities”
in which “different men may all find worthy missions.” Hence, a “‘god of battles’ must
be allowed to be the god for one kind of person, a god of peace and heaven and home, the
god for another. We must frankly recognize the fact that we live in partial systems, and
that parts are not interchangeable in the spiritual life” (420). While our spiritual
inclinations may not be interchangeable, however, James contends optimistically that
they can and do function in harmony to create a greater unity: “Each attitude being a
syllable in human nature’s total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out
completely” (420). We might ask our students to grapple with James’s conclusion here in
conjunction with John Updike’s 2002 short story which bears the same title, “Varieties of
Religious Experience.” Updike’s story depicts one man’s struggle with God in the wake
of the September 11th terrorist attacks; it also focuses on two of the terrorists, one of the
victims, and the passengers on the plane that ultimately crashed in Pennsylvania. This
story appears to reach a different conclusion than the one James draws—having so many
different religious faiths in the world might not, in fact, be such a good thing. As I’ve
argued throughout, however, it’s not a particular conclusion we’re pressing in this class,
it’s how we get to it.
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Debates and Group Presentations
In this section, I’ll first suggest a few possible debate topics for this course and
then I’ll offer some ways in which we can work with group presentations. The value of
group work has become more and more apparent over the years, but with our particular
topic and methodology, group work is likely to be indispensable. If groups are formed
early, used often, and remain intact throughout the semester, a sense of solidarity and
trust will most likely develop among group members; this sense of solidarity tends to
breed a confidence and respect that is more difficult to foster on an individual basis in a
room full of strangers. In this regard, group work enables our exploration of a sensitive
topic like religious faith. As Hephzibah Roskelly notes in her book Breaking (into) the
Circle, “many teachers and students have bad memories of unfortunate group experiences
in their pasts” (xii); group work is often seen by both students and teachers as something
to do to take a break from the real work of the class. As Roskelly argues, however, this
does not have to be, nor should it be, the case. If from the outset teachers break students
into permanent groups, ask each group to give themselves a name and ask students to
work in their groups on a regular basis—thereby giving everyone the impression that
group work is indeed part of the real work of the class—students can often develop a
voice and a sense of agency they otherwise struggle to find or to use. Debates and group
presentations are only two of the ways in which we can make good use of this exercise.
When I assign debates in my writing and speaking courses, I usually break the
class into four groups so we can debate two different issues (two groups debate one thing,
and two groups debate something else). I set aside a few class periods for all of us to
130
narrow down the topics (I think its important to give students a hand in choosing the
topics—the debates tend to be more lively) and then let students work in their groups to
develop their arguments and assign roles (everyone is required to help develop the
group’s presentation and everyone must speak at least once on behalf of their group). 
Using the thinking of William James as a base, I make clear that the goal of each side is
to persuade everyone in the room that their position should be considered as the best
hypothesis we can choose. On the day of the debate, one side gets ten minutes to present
its initial argument and the other side gets the same to present its opening argument. Then
the first side gets seven minutes for rebuttal, and likewise for the other side. I serve as a
mediator of sorts, and I ask those in the audience (the class members not debating on that
day) to jot down a question or comment during the debate. I leave time at the end for the
audience to pose these questions to the debaters.
With respect to religious belief as a public and political issue, I suggest a list like
the following for the class as a whole to choose from (under the above format, only two
topics are needed). I mentioned earlier the topic of evolution. Recently in the New York
Times, Holden Thorp (chairman of the chemistry department at the University of North
Carolina) wrote a brief Op-Ed article entitled “Evolution’s Bottom Line.” In this piece,
Thorp argues that theories of creationism and intelligent design not only hinder our
ability to improve our general condition, but they also hurt our country’s ability to
compete in the global marketplace. He writes that “both sides say they are fighting for
lofty goals and defending the truth. But lost in all this truth-defending are more pragmatic
issues that have to do with the young people whose educations are at stake here and this
131
pesky fact: creationism has no commercial application. Evolution does” (A 27). He goes
on to suggest that “the battle is about more than which truth is truthier, it’s about who
will be allowed to innovate and where they will do it” (A27). We might ask our students
to debate whether or not this is what the battle is really about? Is this what it should be
about? Does creationism really have no commercial application? One group might argue
as ardent Thorp supporters, and the other group might argue as ardent Thorp opposers.
The thing to remember is that we are not arguing whether the creationists or the scientists
are right. We are arguing over Thorp’s contention about their respective usefulness in
society.
This distinction should be emphasized regarding the subsequent topic suggestions
as well: 1.) The Los Angeles Times reports that “about two thirds of U.S medical schools
now offer some form of training on the role of religion and spirituality in medicine,” and
the same article notes that “Walter Larimore, an award-winning physician…has declared
that excluding God from a consultation should be grounds for malpractice” (Sloan).
Should medical schools offer this training, and should we heed Dr. Larimore’s direction?
2.) Each U.S. Supreme Court session begins with, “God save the United States and this
honorable court.” Should this tradition continue? What about other religious displays on
government grounds? 3.) Salman Rushdie wrote, “To respect the sacred is to be
paralyzed by it. The idea of the sacred is quite simply one of the most conservative
notions in any culture, because it seeks to turn other ideas—Uncertainty, Progress,
Change—into crimes” (416). Argue for and against Rushdie’s proposition, and try to
address the related issue of blasphemy? 4.) Should a pharmacist (licensed by the state)
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have the right to refuse to fill a birth control prescription because that pharmacist believes
that to fill such a prescription would violate her religious views? 5.) If we live in a
representative democracy, and most of the people in this democracy believe in God,
shouldn’t the government reflect that belief?
At the end of each debate, I ask every student to write a response. Of the debaters,
I ask, How did it go? Would you do anything differently? Did the other side surprise you
with anything? Is there anything you wanted to say, but didn’t get a chance to? Of the
audience members, I ask, Who put forth a better argument? Why? Was it the substance of
what they said, the way they presented it, or a mixture of both? Have any of your views
on this topic changed because of this debate? This response can be turned in immediately
after the debate and then perhaps included in a Final Portfolio. Debates are usually a lot
of fun—I highly recommend them—but I’ll offer two final bits of practical advice: stick
to the time restraints you set and be certain the topics are clear and concise so the issues
don’t become muddled.
I also strongly recommend group presentations in this class. At the beginning of
the course, we might give groups some quick tasks that they can informally present to the
class (without even leaving their chairs). For instance, after a lesson on deductive
reasoning and syllogisms, groups could come up with their own syllogisms that
encapsulate a particular text, portions of a particular text, or a current event. As the
semester progresses, we can ask them to present more formally at the head of the class.
They might present, for instance, on the way in which they see religious belief
functioning as a social entity in Anton Chekhov’s “The Student.” After a brief biography
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on the author, they may address questions like, Is the story of Peter on the night of the
Last Supper central to this tale? Why, or why not? Does this story provide a useful
answer for the way in which religious faith can help us in the face of a cold and harsh
world? At the end, Chekhov writes of the young theology student, “‘The past,’ he
thought, ‘is linked to the present by an unbroken chain of events all flowing from one to
the other.’ And it seemed to him that he had just seen both ends of the chain, and when he
touched one end the other trembled” (223). Would the power of this chain metaphor work
without the underlying reference to Christianity? Why, or why not? Is the student’s
subsequent “unknown and secret happiness” that “took possession of him little by little”
(223) inextricably linked to the story of Peter and Jesus?
Or, to take another example, we might give a little bit of background on Salman
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (teaching the book itself might be best, but very time
consuming) and the fatwa that followed, and then prompt a group to present to the class
Rushdie’s own response to this incident by exploring his essay “In Good Faith.” What are
Rushdie’s primary points in this essay? What does he say his book is really about? How
does his description of “two struggling worlds, pure and impure, chaste and coarse” as
“juxtaposed…echoes of one another” (401) and his allusion to “the pre-Christian belief”
that “God and the Devil were one and the same” (403) coincide with C. S. Peirce’s
understanding of God, love, and religious faith? How does any of this thinking help us in
the world? What is your general response to some of Rushdie’s overarching arguments?
How might you connect Rushdie’s fatwa with more recent events like the response to
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Pope Benedict’s speech in Germany on September 12, 2006 or the response to twelve
Danish cartoons of Muhammad published on September 30, 2005?
Book clubs, or something like them, may also serve us well by culminating in
group presentations to the class. At the beginning of the course, we might offer a pool of
books on religious faith in the public sphere from which each group chooses a different
one (many of these texts can be found in my bibliography). Each member of the group
must then get her own copy of the book and begin reading it. We can allot some class
time throughout the course for groups to meet to discuss their reading and outline their
roles in presenting this book to the class. One student might give a brief biography of the
author and others may examine and respond to particular arguments or elements of style.
At the end of the semester, after each group presents their book, ten or fifteen minutes
may be allotted for questions or comments from the rest of the class. Like the debates, I
also suggest a written response from both the audience members and the presenters. The
audience might answer questions like, Have you heard of this author or this book before.
What new ideas about our topic did you hear today? Based on this presentation, if you
were to write a letter to this author, what would you say to her? If we had more time,
what questions or comments would you put to this group? Presenters might comment on
prompts such as, “Did this book turn out to be what you expected? Would you
recommend it to a friend? Why did your group choose this particular book? Has this book
shed any new light on our topic for you? If you were to write a letter to this author, what
would you tell her or ask her?
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Both debates and group presentations offer students the opportunity to work
closely with some of their peers and help establish a bit of a collaborative base from
which to work on our tricky subject. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, I
believe group work to be invaluable in this class. However we choose to employ this
strategy, though, we do well to remind ourselves that we are focused on the usefulness of
faith in the public world, not its “truthiness.”
Writing Assignments
In this section I will briefly list a handful of writing assignments that are, as I
mentioned earlier, intended for inclusion in a Final Portfolio; they may also, of course, be
taken otherwise. They are familiar assignments—a persuasive essay, an annotated
bibliography, a critical analysis, a query, and a reflection letter—geared toward our
pragmatic exploration of religious faith in the public realm. The order is not crucial, nor
are they all necessarily recommended in the same semester. I do suggest an annotated
bibliography early on so that students might begin to see what is “out there” and, of
course, the reflection letter at the end of the term. During the first couple weeks, for
instance, as we are talking about the Pragmatists with respect to faith, we might also
spend some time in the library to work on the annotated bibliography. Students may find
three to five sources on our topic, cite these sources in MLA format, and write a brief
description of that source after each citation. The description should be five or six
sentences long, providing a summary of the source and how the student thinks that source
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is useful in negotiating the issue at hand. This bibliography may also help to create a pool
of books for a possible book club assignment.
Leading up to the Persuasive essay, we might begin with Aristotle’s definition of
rhetoric (finding the best available means of persuasion) and his related rhetorical
triangle. After reading a few texts on our topic (in addition to those I listed above under
Texts, I also recommend Robert Johnson’s “Teaching the Forbidden” and Deal W.
Hudson’s “Thinking about God”), we can prompt our students to work from Aristotle’s
triangle to persuade their audience to think in a certain way or act in a certain way
regarding religious faith as a social or political force. In other words, the writer should
pay particular attention to how she situates her ethos, makes logical arguments and
emotional appeals to convince her reader that her argument is not only a live hypothesis,
as James puts it, but the best option. And it must be made evident how the truth of this
argument successfully runs the gauntlet of our other relevant truths. We might also ask
students to write a critical analysis of a text or a cultural event from a pragmatic
perspective. What are the primary arguments at stake? How might we, as a society, be
better off if these arguments were believed to be true or untrue? How else might a
pragmatist analyze this text or event? In a similar vein, we might assign what we can call
a query where we prompt students to enter a specific dialogue by asking questions and
reserving judgment; i.e., enter the dialogue without knowing the answer beforehand, and
leave the dialogue without having reached a firm conclusion. For example, regarding the
public role of the church, C. S. Peirce differs from John Dewey, George Eliot differs
from Stephen Carter, Elizabeth Cady Stanton differs from Jim Wallis. Students might
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write an essay where they simply “talk” with a few of these authors about their positions,
raising their own questions, arguments, and angles. Finally, we might ask students to
write a reflection letter at the end of the course in which they look back on the work they
have done, commenting on what they struggled with, what they felt went well, what they
might do differently, how they view their writing process at the end of the term, ect. We
might also ask them to consider our project—was it difficult for them to discuss religious
faith in this way? How do they think the pragmatic method helped us talk about this issue
and where did this method fail?
All of the assignments and texts I have suggested in this chapter are meant to be
taken in conjunction with one another, mixed and matched as one sees fit. They are
primarily intended to help students become better writers, but they are also intended to
coincide with the pragmatic approach that can help us theorize and talk about religious
belief as a social issue—an approach based in critical literacy, social responsibility,
reevaluating our habits, and inspired from, as Wislawa Szymborska puts it, “a continuous
‘I Don’t Know.’”
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CHAPTER V
BELIEF AND DISBELIEF: PRAGMATIC
PARTNERS IN THE WRITING CLASS
How can outsiders discuss
insiders’ beliefs with anything
like fairness and accuracy?
Sharon Crowley
In the preface to her recent book Toward a Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and
Fundamentalism, Sharon Crowley admits that her status as “an outsider to conservative
religious thought” brings to the surface some of the primary questions she aims to
address: “How can believers converse with unbelievers” and how “is it possible to
persuade people who subscribe to intensely resonant belief systems to adopt different
positions?” (ix). Crowley draws on classical rhetoric to explore how we might be able to
start talking to one another in our contemporary political climate, but she notes from the
outset the difficulty of answering these initial questions, and adds that ultimately she has
only found but “a few paths” (x). One of the issues I have tried to address in this project
is the way in which “outsiders” and “insiders” have fixed, preconceived notions of what
the other holds to be true: in other words, to use James’ terminology, they both claim to
know “beforehand” and have thus closed off not only possible hypotheses but channels of
conversation as well. Theists and atheists alike are guilty of this limitation. As an
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“insider” of the latter group, however, my aim in this conclusion is to extend the above
application of the pragmatic method to religious disbelief, for atheists are no more “off
the hook” than theists in our context of the writing class. First, though, a brief discussion
of the term atheism is required.
Most atheists in the United States have had ample opportunity to consider God as
a live hypothesis; they either grew up as I did with families who went to church every
Sunday or they otherwise absorbed Christian traditions as an indelible part of our national
culture. Most atheists have not rejected “belief” as it might be understood in opposition to
science or logic—they have only rejected the notion that God, as described in the Bible,
actually exists. Theism is a belief in God. Atheism is not a belief. It is simply a response
to one particular belief (denoted by the prefix “a”). As such, it doesn’t even indicate on
what grounds this response is based. As George Smith writes, “If a person is designated
as a theist, this tells us that he believes in a god, not why he believes. If a person is
designated as an atheist, this tells us that he does not believe in a god, not why he does
not believe” (8). One can rightly be called an atheist, then, not because he champions
reason and science, but because he believes that canines are responsible for our creation
and our sanctity.
Nonetheless, in the United States atheists have often been and are still very much
today cast as hollow and amoral in large part because belief in God has become
synonymous with integrity and morality. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee opined in
1871, “The man who has the hardihood to avow that he does not believe in God, shows a
recklessness of moral character and utter want of moral responsibility, such as very little
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entitles him to be heard or believed in a court of justice in a country designated as
Christian” (4). Such a perspective has its roots in the Bible; Jesus, for instance, advises
that nonbelievers will be cast “into the furnace of fire” where “men will weep and gnash
their teeth,” much as “the weeds are gathered and burned with fire…” (Matthew 13. 40-
42). Leviticus and Deuteronomy are replete with similar commands: “If your
brother…or your son or daughter, or the spouse whom you embrace…tries to secretly
seduce you, saying, ‘Let us go and serve other gods’…you must show him no pity, you
must not spare him or conceal is guilt. No, you must kill him…you must stone him to
death, since he has tried to divert you from Yahweh your God…” (Deuteronomy 13. 7-
11). Theologians through the centuries have, to varying degrees, reinforced these
instructions. Thomas Aquinas, for example, proposed in no uncertain terms that “the sin
of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals” and that after
committing this offense a third time, the offender must “be exterminated from the world
by death” (Smith 4).
This potent history that has so defined the atheist has left her feeling like she has
some explaining to do. Indeed, “atheism, it is charged, is nothing but pure negativism: it
destroys but does not rebuild” (Smith 5). Disbelief in Yahweh has morphed (or has been
manipulated) into disbelief period save a cold, intellectual wasteland devoid of real
sentiment. This is unfortunate, because our everyday experiences tell us something
different. They tell us that atheists believe in luck and love and karma and momentum
and ghosts and all kinds of things that one can’t see or reason through. Atheists read tarot
cards, talk to plants, find strength in the spirit of dead relatives, and base their lives on a
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mixture of intuition and reason as much as any devout Catholic. And yet, while we no
longer have to fear being executed as godless and hence amoral creatures, the stereotype
persists. In 1994, Stephen Carter published his influential and oft cited book, The Culture
of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion. The title
alone suggests that there is a secular movement (aimed at trivializing and disparaging
people of faith) led by those without any capacity for belief—i.e. disbelief in Catholic
dogma is equated with general “Disbelief.” In his foreword to a recent edition, Carter
writes that maybe one of the reasons his “book has struck a chord” is because so many
people “are coming to understand the possibility that a culture can grow too secularized,”
and he adds that he is optimistic for the future “because it is impossible to envision a
serious public discussion of morality from which the religious voice is absent” (xvi). The
term “too secularized” can easily be read as “too atheistic,” and both are meant to imply a
lack of moral capability (atheists and secularists are, in fact, later described as simply
“devoted to sweet reason” (24)). I do agree with Carter, however, that faith should be
allowed every opportunity to be heard in the public forum—on all pertinent issues for
maintaining a democracy, including morality—but in this forum it must pass the same
muster as all our other voices.
That is the crucial distinction between religious belief as practiced in the privacy
of one’s home and religious faith as offered for the basis of public policy. In our
democracy, when the stakes become higher, we demand more proof. For example, in our
justice system, the standard of proof in a criminal case is “beyond a reasonable doubt”
while the standard of proof in a civil case is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The
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standard is higher in the former because the stakes are higher—in a criminal proceeding
one can lose life and liberty, but in a civil proceeding one can only lose money and
property. All that atheists are asking is that in a debate of ideas for the common good,
religious faith not be given preferential treatment—or granted a lesser standard of
proof—simply because it is religious faith. The stakes are too high. Carter laments that
“we often ask our citizens to split their public and private selves, telling them in effect
that it is fine to be religious in private, but there is something askew when those private
beliefs become the basis for public action” (Carter 8). Those of us who do not believe in
the Biblical God only find something askew, however, when these private beliefs are
allowed to power public action on the sole basis of their religious nature and not because
they are in tune with our other democratic principals. If they can’t meet the same scrutiny
as all our other proposals, then they should indeed remain a private matter.
Carter argues, however, that asking a person to keep her religion a private matter
trivializes that belief, and that we must fight against a culture that treats religion “like
building model airplanes, just another hobby; something quiet, something private,
something trivial” (22). But his inference that to privatize faith necessarily leads to
trivializing it seems dubious. As Richard Rorty points out in his brief response to Carter’s
book, “our family and love lives are private, nonpolitical and nontrivial. The poems we
atheists write, like the prayers our religious friends raise, are private, nonpolitical, and
nontrivial.” There are, Rorty continues, “lots of other private pursuits that both give
meaning to individual human lives and are such that mature, public-spirited adults are
quite right in not attempting to use them as a basis for politics. The search for private
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perfection, pursued by theists and atheists alike, is neither trivial nor, in a pluralistic
democracy, relevant to public policy” (Philosophy 170). Furthermore, as I described in
chapter two with respect to public policy, for a pragmatist it doesn’t matter where the
belief comes from, it just matters how useful that belief is to all of us at the moment (and
in the future). The belief could come from a Batman comic, Homer’s Odyssey, the Koran
or the Bible. It’s origin makes no difference. Again in response to Carter, Rorty suggests
that the epistemology suitable for [our] democracy is one in which the only test
of a political proposal is its ability to gain assent from people who retain radically
diverse ideas about the point and meaning of human life, about the path to private
perfection. The more such consensus becomes the test of a belief, the less
important is the belief’s source. So when Carter complains that religious citizens
are forced ‘to restructure their arguments in purely secular terms before they can
be presented’, I should reply that ‘restructuring the arguments in purely secular
terms’ just means dropping reference to the source of the premises of the
arguments, and that this omission seems a reasonable price to pay for religious
liberty. (173, emphasis mine)
This price Rorty refers to is, in fact, no more than any of us pay when proposing public
policy. My views on abortion may have their roots in a picture my grandmother drew
when she was a teenager, but as a diverse community, we have our hands full worrying
about the possible consequences of my views without spending energy on where they
might have come from.
In continuing to shift the focus away from a belief’s origins and towards its
consequences, Rorty outlines the term “anticlericalism.” In “Anticlericalism and
Atheism,” he suggests that the argument over whether or not God really exists is besides
the point, and therefore so too are the tags “theist” and “atheist.” He now describes
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himself as an anticleric rather than an atheist because “anticlericalism is a political view,
not an epistemological or metaphysical one. It is the view that ecclesiastical institutions,
despite all the good they do—despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in
despair—are dangerous to the health of democratic societies” (Future 33). In making this
argument, Rorty refers to the thinking of Gianni Vattimo who, Rorty says, “wants to
dissolve the problem of the coexistence of natural science with the legacy of Christianity
by identifying Christ neither with truth nor with power but with love alone” (Future 36).
The direction that both Rorty and Vattimo pursue here aligns in many respects with
Dewey’s distinction between religion as an institutional noun beholden to certain truths
and religious as a contingent adjective beholden only to love and human happiness
(Peirce’s distinction between a Gospel of Love and a Gospel of Greed is also apt).
Vattimo develops his argument from the idea of kenosis, whereby God
relinquishes everything to us. This perspective, Vattimo writes, aims in part to pave “the
way for a renewed dialogue with the Christian tradition, to which I have always belonged
(as the rest of modernity), yet whose meaning has become incomprehensible to me”
(Future 65). A new dialogue is desperately needed, he argues, if we are “to avoid the
impasse in which modern consciousness always finds itself when confronted by Christian
revelation: the impossibility of adhering to a doctrine that appears too sharply contrasted
with the ‘conquests’ of enlightened reason, too full of myths which demand to be
unmasked” (66). By grappling with the meaning of kenosis—the transfer of love and
charity from God to humans, i.e., the act of Incarnation—we are able to conclude that
“Christ himself is the unmasker, and that the unmasking inaugurated by him…is the
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meaning of the history of salvation itself” (66). Within this process of unmasking—a
process in which we take an active role by continuing what Christ started—Vattimo urges
that believing
in salvation will not mean adhering to the letter of everything that is written
in the Gospel and in the dogmatic teaching of the Church, but rather in trying to
understand the meaning of the evangelical text for me, here, now. In other words,
reading the signs of the times with no other provision than the commandment of
love. (66)
As the search has been handed over to us and as it will always be contingent on future
contexts, faith is no longer about foundational truth and power, but rather situational love
and charity, or contextual responsibility to other human beings. In this light, there is no
longer a hierarchal relationship between us and God; there is no longer a need to worship.
And we can also see “all the great unmaskers of the West, from Copernicus and Newton
to Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud, as carrying out works of love” (Future 38). They were,
as Vattimo puts it, “reading the signs of the times” with the goal of increasing the
possibility for human happiness. From this perspective (or to use Kenneth Burke’s
phrase, from this particular terministic screen), people like Freud and Nietzsche may be
understood as leading religious figures.
An overwhelming majority in the U. S., however, do not take this approach to
religious faith. Stephen Carter defines religion as “a tradition of group worship” (17), a
definition most would likely agree with. If they care at all, atheists more often than not
respect a person’s private right to worship with others (in some respects, we are even a
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bit envious). It’s only when worship gets moved to the public forum where we get a bit
unsettled because this term implies to us a subservient, uncritical service to something
behind us, above us, and beyond us. Public policies drawn from this practice may or may
not coincide with our other democratic values, and that is why it is imperative that they
consistently “run the gauntlet” of all our other truths. Again, it’s the consequences of any
belief that receives (that must receive) our criticism, not a person’s private choice to
believe. To take an example, next to Nietzsche and Freud, Karl Marx stands as perhaps
one of our most famous (or infamous, depending upon one’s lens) contemporary atheists.
His views on religion, however, have been widely misunderstood in just this way. “The
classical Marxist critique of religion,” as Cornel West notes, “is not an a priori
philosophical rejection of religion; rather, it is a social analysis of and historical judgment
upon religious practices” (Philosophy 373). In fact, “contrary to such wide-spread crypto-
Marxist myths about religion, Marx and Engels understood religion as a profound human
response to, and protest against, intolerable conditions” (373). For both Marx and Engels,
religious faith had the possibility of being intimately bound up with Vattimo’s following
description of human history:
The historicity of my existence is provenance, and emancipation—salvation or
redemption—consists in recognizing that Being is event, a recognition that
enables me to enter actively into history, instead of passively contemplating its
necessary laws…this is the meaning of the statement ‘I no longer call you
servants but friends.’ (Belief 78)
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It’s only when worship and religious faith negate such an active assertion of Being and
our ability to improve the conditions for our collective Being that Marx, and lesser-
known atheists, tend to voice an objection.
But where does that leave us? As Vattimo admits, when “I reflect on all this, I no
longer know what I am saying when I recite the Lord’s prayer. But it seems to me that
this disorientation also belongs to my experience of faith as well” (78). There is evidence
to suggest that more and more people are recognizing a similar disorientation in the
United States. As Nicholas Kristof writes in a New York Times article, “The number of
avowed atheists is tiny, with only 1 to 2 percent of Americans describing themselves in
polls as atheists. But about 15 percent now say they are not affiliated with any religion,
and this vague category is sometimes described as the fastest-growing ‘religious group’
in America today” (A29). There’s an in-between space, so to speak, that more and more
people are finding themselves confronted with, and there’s certainly a need for a more
effective and useful dialogue about religious belief in our country. I turned to C.S. Peirce
who wanted a great Catholic church but argued that the church is what the church does—
it can preach a Gospel of Greed or a Gospel of Love. I turned to William James who
argued we have every right to believe in religion and that “in the end it is our faith and
not our logic that decides [many of our] questions” (Pragmatism 130); our faith, however,
must run the gauntlet of all our other truths. And I turned to John Dewey, who saw
religious belief as having the possibility of being everything for us if it could only
extricate itself from the supernatural. These pragmatists—together with folks like
Emerson, Rorty, West, and Vattimo—offer atheists, theists, agnostics, anticlerics, and
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those who fall somewhere in-between a common method that can help us move forward
by looking not to the source of a belief, but to its consequences.
In a speech commemorating civil war hero Robert Shaw, William James said,
“Democracy is still upon trial. The civic genius of our people is its only bulwark, and
neither laws nor monuments, neither battleships nor public libraries, nor great
newspapers nor booming stocks; neither mechanical invention nor political adroitness,
nor churches nor universities…can save us from degeneration if the inner mystery is lost”
(Trilling 963). Whatever we call it, this inner mystery guides most of us, and we are hard-
pressed not to see it as an indelible part of developing public policy for the common
good. It’s when this mystery is offered as somehow extricable and fixed that we must be
sure to judge it by the same standards as the rest of our public-spirited proposals. The
pragmatists can help us do just that as we begin to grapple with religious belief in the
composition class.
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